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ABSTHAG'f 
Since the Second World Vifar, economic planning by 
a central authority has become increasingly popular in 
developing countries. 'fhe governments of the newly independent 
nations of Southeast Asia believe that to achieve a rapid 
economic growth, each country must operate on a planned basis. 
1conomic planning was accepted as an essential means for 
guiding and accelerating economic development • 
.§cope of the Thesis 
This thesis attempts a general survey of economic 
planning in eight countries namely: Burma, 'l'hailand, i;ialaysia , 
Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines. The 
basic problems faced in the process of economic planning as 
well as effectiveness of the plans in Southeast Asian regions 
are considered. As countries in Southeast Asia nave similar 
economic, social unc~ cultural charactbristico, ce.•:-c;;.in general-
izations can be 1.1ade Nith regard to their basic development 
problems. 
Economic planning implies a substantial degree of 
irl 
centralization"policy-making particularly if the aim, in part, 
of such planning is improving t he climate for private enterprise 
and perfecting the operations of' relatively free markets. In 
Southeast Asia, although a certain amount of government planning 
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·~ .~ j exists in all the countries, the content of their plans varies 
considerably. Intensive study of the plans of each individual 
country is beyond the scope of t he thesis; th~refore, only 
basic aspects of economic planning are considered on a regional 
basis. However, as Burma vms the first country in Southeast 
Asia which attempted comprehensive planning on the aggregate 
as vTell as the sector level, the experience of economic planning 
in Burma is discussed in some detail. 
The research covers the period from the end of 
the Second \~orld ivar U.l1til 1960. Thereaf ter, t 1e role of 
economic planning in Southeast ,\sia has increased in 
importance, HovTever, as great variations now exist in the 
a ppro&ches, formulation and execution of plans, it is not 
appropriate to make generalizations on t he basis of the 
experience in planning: of Southeast Asia as a whole after 1960. 
Objective of t he Thesis 
'rhe ma in objective i s to analyse the reasons the 
countries in Southeas t Asia r elied heavily on central pl anning 
f or their economic development and how successful they have 
been in their attempts to achieve rc..pid economic pl anning. 
In ot.her words, thi s thesis is to analyse: 
l . 'l'he basic problems facing t he Southe.:tst. Asian countries , 
2. I'Jhy t he governments attempted to solve the problems thvough 
economic pl anning, 
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3, The experience of Burma in her attempts to achieve rapid 
growth through a comprehensive economic planning. 
4, The effectiveness of economic planning in the region as a 
whole. 
5. The reasons why national plans have failed to achieve their 
objectives, 
6. Possible solutions for some of the problems these nations 
have faced in planning • 
The writer has obtained most of the necessary 
materials from United Nations publications, especially those 
of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Research 
on the experience of economic planning in Bun1a was based 
mainly on the data provided by the Central Statistics and 
Economics Department, Ministry of National Planning, and 
annual government publications such as Economic Survey of 
Burma. Detailed analysis of the experience of other Southeast 
Asian countries could not be undertaken due to the limited 
amount of information available. 
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CHAPTER I 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Southeast Asia is comprised of eight countries 
south of China and east of India and Pakistan -- that is, 
Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Veitnam, ~~laysia, 
and the Philippines. The population of the area is approximately 
200 million; the average rate of population growth is about 
2.4 percent per annum,l All the countries in Southeast Asia 
are predominantly agricultural and the proportion of the labor 
force engaged in agriculture varies from 65 percent to 85 per-
cent. Low per capita income is a serious problem: the region 
has average per capita incomes of approximately $111 per year, 
Thus, policy to promote rapid growth is becoming increasingly 
popular in Southeast Asia as in other underdeveloped countries. 
In trying to promote eco~omic growth, Southeast Asian countries 
are faced with various obstacles, social, economic and political 
in nature. Hence, before any discussion of policy and plans 
for economic development, basic problems prevailing in the 
area should be analysed in some detail, 
A. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS 
Climate, history and culture in Southeast Asia are 
1 Source - Statistics and Reports Division; U.S. 
Agency for International Development. Population and the 
rate of growth until 1961. 
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totally different from those of the Western countries. Most 
of the areas in the region have civilizations that were old 
when the West was still young. To a western observer, the 
problem may not be so much 11one of economic growth within an 
existing social framework, but the replacement of one civili-
zation by another .n2 
As Kuznet had said: 11The major capital stock of an 
industrially advanced nation is not its physical equipment; 
it is the body of knowledge amassed from tested findings and 
discoveries of empirical science and the capacity and training 
of its population to use this knowledge effectively. n3 Social 
factors -- the social response to economic factors and the 
readiness to undergo economic change -- influence the productivity 
and capacity of labor for economic development. Various degrees 
of resistance to economic change are to be found in most parts 
. !/;~ 
<1 of Southeast Asia today. Some of the poorer sections of the 
... .. 
. j 
people appear unfavorable or indifferent to new forms of 
industrial production and unfamiliar ways of life. Even in 
the small upper class, prestige is attached to the ownership 
of land, a military career, diplomacy, or some other traditional 
2 Cairncross, A.K., "Economic Development and the 
\~est, 11 'l'hree Banks Review, December 1957, p. 63 • 
3 United Nations Process and Problems of Industri-
' - -~lization in Underdeveloped Countries, New York, 1955, P· 5. 
. ' ·' 
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occupation. Industry or business as a career is considered 
to be unworthy of an educated n~n's attention. 
It has been observed that the strong family loyal-
ties act as an obstacle to economic development. In most 
underdeveloped countries, including Southeast Asia, the term 
"family" has a different and wider cor.notation than custo~ry 
in more industrialized societies, "Family" includes many 
distant relatives and in ~ny ways refers to a group more akin 
to a clan than the family in a narrow sense. A man has 
obligations towards much larger number of people. The 
institution of an extended family is feature of a subsistence 
or near-subsistence economy in Southeast Asia. There are some 
social virtues of this kind of a family system, but on the other 
hand, it makes a man unwilling and unable to work hard because 
he knows that if he succeeds in improving his position he will 
have to maintain a larger number of relatives. At the same 
time the ~stem minimises the inducement for people to improve 
their own position because they can count on being provided 
with the means of subsistence at a level not very different 
from the majority of their kinsmen, Thus the supply curves 
of labor may be backward sloping with respect to income because 
the personal incentives are dulled by the necessity of 
contributing all the work while sharing the fruits, Also, 
where personal obligations to family and friends count heavily, 
the new worker in an industrial enterprise may not easily develop 
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4 
a sense of responsibility to the factory where he works or 
to the industry as a whole. For example, in most Southeast 
Asian countries where unemployment is severe, the practice 
d putting relatives on the payroll, even though they are 
incompetent, can have a serious effect on a large enterprise 
and may be disastrous to a small one. 
Economic development requires an open class structure 
in which social mobility is possible so that a strong middle 
class can come into being in which entrepreneurial and 
professional skills prevail. In most underdeveloped countries, 
and Southeast Asia is no exception, class structure is very 
rigid; the middle class is very weak. The majority is in the 
low income class which comprises of over 50 percent of the 
population but takes up less than 10 percent of the total 
national income; and a few people {less than 5 percent of the 
population) in the upper class which takes up over 50 percent 
of the total national income. As the middle class is customaril y 
engaged in commerce, industry, and other professions such as 
law, medicine, science, teaching, accounting, engineering, 
and government, these energies and abilities can be beneficial 
to economic growth. However, only about 20 percent of the 
population can be considered as middle class in Southeast Asia, 
and social mobility is very rigid. This has a considerable 
effect on the growth of the area. 
I· . 
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5 
In Southeast Asia, the majority of the people are 
Buddhists and quite a high percentage are Moslems. Buddhism 
strongly emphasizes self denial, asceticism, abstinence and 
cultivation of spirit, To be too ambitious and greedy is 
sinful, and to build shrines and pagodas is the most virtuous 
act of all for a Buddhist. As v/alinsky said, "No title in the 
Burmese society is so revered as that of a 'Pagoda Builder' •••• 
even the poor may aspire in a humble way to this honor although 
the pagoda they build may be only three feet high. 114 This sort 
of attitude checks the motivation to work hard, to earn more 
and more for fear that the sin of greed may come in; instead 
encouragement is given to unproductive investment in pagodas 
(building of pagodas, apart from solving, temporarily, the 
unemployment problem, has no economic benefit to the economy) . 
The majority of the people in the low income group have no 
ambition, whatsoever, to improve their wellbeing, and are 
happy and contented in living in the subsistence level. "The 
Burman is typically improvident •••• He displays little concern 
for his future security, but spends freely to enjoy life to 
the fullest possible degree •••• Rare is the man , no matter how 
low his income, who will not manage to buy a piece of gold and 
jewelry for his wife, n5 'fhus, religion is partly responsible 
4 Walinsky, Louis J., ~conomic Development of Burma, 
1951-1960; Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, P• 389. 
5 Ibid., p. 390. 
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for their attitudes and although religion may have served as 
a part. of economic advance in many western countries (for 
example, the Protestant Ethic), it has in many ways hindered 
the economic growth in Southeast Asia, 
B, ECONO~ITC PROBLEI!JIS 
1. Labor Problems, 
Problems concerning labor should be discussed as a 
factor of production influencing the growth of a nation, 
However, before the qualitative aspects of labor are discussed, 
quantative aspects of labor such as population problems should 
be given some consideration as being important in helping or 
hindering economic growth. 
One cannot regard Southeast Asia as a densely 
populated area because on the average, its population density 
is approximately 143 persons per square mile as compared with 
347 in India, 403 in Ceylon, 660 in Japan, and 830 in Taiwan.6 
However, the rate of growth of population in the area is 2.4 
percent which is quite high and cannot be ignored. Where 
population is growing as rapidly as in Southeast Asia, there 
is a need for new capital formation in schools, housing, 
hospitals, transportation systems, eta., that is social capital 
6 · d R o· . . US Source - Stat1stics an eports 1V1s1on, •• 
Agency for International Development. 
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7 
items, if economic conditions are to remain constant, let 
alone improve. Progress is held back because most of the 
money saved after meeting essential consumption needs has 
to be used just to prevent retrogression. Also, in Southeast 
Asia, the composition of the population is such that a low 
proportion is in the working age group. For example, according 
to the United Nations estimates, the number of persons of 
dependent ages per 1, 000 persons of ~tor king age (15 to 64) is 
approximately 90 in the Philippines against 55 in the United 
States and 51 in Sweden.? High birth rates play an important 
part in this result. Also, the death rate is falling in Southeast 
Asia, which is one of the causes of the increasing rate of 
population growth. Life expectancy remains very low so that the 
young who are fed and educated frequently do not live long enough 
to repay what society has invested in their upbringing. 
Rapidly increasing population has brought about a 
severe unemployment problem in Southeast Asia. The sample 
survey conducted in the Philippines in May 1956 had indicated 
that the level of unemployment was 1.2 million or about 13 per-
cent of the labor force.s This situation \~s probably 
illustrative of the experience in other Southeast Asian countries. 
? 7 Uni ~ed Na ~io,n s, Economic .S6vGy of Asia and the 
l~ East, 1961, E,C. A.F.E., Bangkok, 19 2, p. 13. 
8 National Jkonomic Council, The li'ive-Year Economic 
amJ. Social Development Program, F'or F'Y 1957-1961, 111anila , 1957, 
p. 5. 
I· 
One of the causes of unemployment or underemployment 
in Southeast Asia is immobility of labor. The majority of the 
labor force are farmers who will not move out from their farms 
although the marginal productivity of labor on many farms may 
be negative. They are unskilled for industrial work and are 
not willing to become trained as they do not want to leave their 
homes. Thus there is overpopulation and underemployment in the 
rural sector and a need for skilled labor in the industrial 
sector. The minority of young people from rural areas who are 
ambitious enough to seek employment in industrial or business 
sector are quite unskilled and find it difficult to adjust 
themselves to the systematic life of an industrial worker, 
resulting in low levels of productivity. On the other extreme, 
there are people with abilities as economists, lawyers, physicists, 
chemists, etc., who have obtained their advanced education 
from industrial western countries, and who are underemployed 
when they return because their countries are not ready to make 
best use of their resources for cultural, financial and 
political reasons. Thus most Southeast Asian countries are 
faced with absolutely unskilled people on one hand, and skilled 
people which the country is not developed enough to use, on the 
other hand. What seems required are skilled workers to make 
use of the present resources eff iciently. But these kind of 
workers are scarce in Southeast Asia. Thus there is a wastage 
of human resources. 
I· 
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2. £,trepreneurial Problems, 
Another problem is the scarcity of entrepreneurial 
and managerial abilities. As Adler and Krishnaswamy commented, 
"In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to 
the supply of entrepreneurship as a strategic factor, which 
aside from capital, determines the rate of growth and develop-
ment.nlO In Southeast Asia, due to social and cultural 
attitudes, lack of capital, or lack of knowledge and skills, 
entrepreneurship, that is willingness to take risk and innovate, 
is lacking. People who have money would rather own real estates 
and jewelery than go into the industrial field mainly because 
of ignorance of the returns that can be obtained through 
investment. Some who have natural entrepreneurial talent do 
not have financial means to make use of their talent. Therefore, 
one problem is to have the two groups of people get together. 
It is probably easy to seek out the entrepreneurial talent 
but to get the money holders to finance them can be quite 
difficult because money markets and banking habits are not very 
developed in Southeast Asia, 
To make matters worse, public administration at all 
levels is a major deficiency in Southeast Asia 1 s development. 
10 Adler, J.H. and Kishnas~~my, K,S. ,nGomments on 
Professor Bye 1 s Paper," Economic Development in Latin America, 
edited by Ellis, H,S., St. ~~r~n Press, New York, 1961, p. 126. 
10 
This deficiency had its origin in the colonial administration 
inherited from the British (in Burma and Ivialaysia), French 
(Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia), and Dutch (Indonesia), and the 
,, Americans (The Philippines). After their independence, most 
of them suffered from the loss of qualified staff which led 
to the misplacement of officials. For example, administrative 
staff were put into technical fields in which they have no 
background. Also, as Walinsky has stated, "Staff management 
and supervision were highly inadequate and unsystematic •••• 
the typical office gave the impression of a badly kept archive 
which was being used temporarily as a hiring hall. nll There 
.. were also problems of overlapping of organizational and staffing 
.·!': 
arrangements and procedural weaknesses which are wasteful in 
many ways. 
3. Land Problems. 
Richness in natural resources is one of the determinants 
of economic growth. Casual observers would claim Southeast 
Asia as very rich in natural resources: agriculture, fisheries, 
timber, minerals, and water resources. This is hardly true in 
present situation. There is no doubt that Southeast Asia had 
.... ,. very rich resources, but many such as minerals, oil and timber 
resources were exploited before the Second World War by the 
Colonial powers. For example, Burma had very rich oil resources 
11. Walinsky, op. cit., p. 407. 
I· -. 
: .·.' 
11 
during the British rule; most of the oil was extracted at that 
time and now the present government is left .with a few exploitable 
fields, and has been searching for more oil for some years with 
little success, The same is the situation in other minerals 
such as tin, copper, lead, etc, 
Some countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia for 
example, have a wide variety of resources. However, as Higgins 
has stated, "it is by no means clear how adequate the quantity, 
quality and the location of these resources are when considered 
in relation to 80 million people (90 million now) and an annual 
rate of population of at least 1.5 percent (2.3 percent now) •••• 
there is thus no clear evidence that Indonesia has the natural 
resources required to produce a per capita income for 80 million 
people comparable to that of the more advanced European countries, 
at least with present levels of managerial and technical skills, nl2 
For example, United Nations estimates showed that Indonesia 
recently has barely maintained food production per head at 
1953-1957 levels.13 
In relation to its population, Southeast Asia has 
a smaller endowment of natural resources than most underdeveloped 
countries, Population increase remains high but food production 
12 Higgins, Benjamin, "Indonesia's Development Plans 
and Problems," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, June 1956, p. 111. 
13 United Nations, Economic SurveY. of Asia and the 
I~ East, 12£1 t.C.A,F.E,, Bangkok, 1964, p. 120. 
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12 
has risen at the annual rate of 0.5 percent as against 
population increase of 2.4 percent per year.l4 It is only 
in the continental Southeast Asian countries such as Burma, 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietmam that 
food supply has outspaced population growth. This food situation 
is disturbing, not only from the basic standpoint of low 
nutritional standards, but also for the planning of economic 
development. In all Southeast Asian countries, agricultural 
output consists of food products and agriculture's contributions 
to the Gross Domestic Product ranges from 40 percent to 55 per-
cent. Food consumption is an even higher proportion of national 
expenditure because the region, after being a net food exporter 
before the Second World War has become an increasing net 
importer of foodstuffs, thus straining resources of foreign 
exchange which are urgently needed for purposes of economic 
development. Therefore, the richness of natural resources 
in Southeast Asia is commonly exaggerated, 
There is little doubt, however, that the land in 
Southeast Asia is fertile and suitable for growing agricultural 
crops. This factor, together with the lack of capital and 
technology, makes the countries in Southeast Asia specialize 
heavily on agricultural export commodities: Burma, Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Veitnam rely heavily on their rice exports to 
14 United Nat~ons, ~conomic g~vey of Asia and the 
Far Eas~, 12.§1,(E.C.A.F.~., Bangkok, 19 4 , p. 199. 
I· 
13 
pay for their imports; and ~'lalaysia, Indonesia and the 
PhiliPpines on rubber and sugar products. This lack of 
diversification in export trade is dangerous to economic 
development of the area. Each country is trying to be self-
sufficient in agricultural products and plans to improve its 
agricultural sector so that it can curtail agricultural imports. 
The future prospects of the agricultural product 
exporting countries are not bright, and there is the danger 
of economic instability as a result of the heavy reliance 
on agriculture. For example, in 1955 nearly 80 percent of 
Burma's export \~S agricultural products; when the price of 
rice in the world's market fell during that period, Burma's 
foreign exchange earnings fell sharply; imports had to be cut 
down unexpectedly leading to excess demand within the country 
and inflationary pressures. The majority of the population, 
being mainly agricultural suffered greatly during that time 
and the Eight-Year economic plan of Burma was disrupted. At 
present, all the countries in Southeast Asia have plans to 
diversify products. Expansion of output in agricultural 
commodities for exports frequently proves difficult or trouble-
some because of occasional insufficiencies in market demand. 
l!:mphasis on way:~ and means to increase raw material production 
can be harmful because agriculture commodities usually have 
inelastic demands and also because substitutes for those products 
·· " can often be produced by developed countries at cheaper prices. 
• .. ·· 
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4. Problems in Capital Accumulation. 
Inadequate capital funds is perhaps the most serious 
drawback in all underdeveloped countries especially those 
countries in Southeast Asia. To quote Kindlebeger, 11Capital 
is regarded not only as central to the process of development 
but also strategic, The process of capital formation is inter-
acting and cumulative: capital formation increases income which 
makes possible more capital formation,,,,Once the process is 
started it feeds on itself, The rich get richer and the poor 
get children. 1115 The main problem in Southeast Asia is that 
of poverty. Per capita income ranges from ~50 to *200 per 
annuml6 which is desperately low. Low income leads to low 
consumption and saving, very limited ability to undertake and 
:}. sustain investment which will again lead to low income; thus 
-··~· "':<; 
these countries are faced with the vicious circle of poverty. 
An initial task in efforts to promote economic 
development is to discover which elements in the vicious circle 
are the basic causes and to determine how this vicious circle 
can be dealt with so as to induce sustained economic growth, 
In the decade of the fifties, very little improvement has taken 
place in the productive capacity or the consumption level of 
l5. Kindlebeger, C,P., Economic Development, 1958 
Economic Handbook Series, p. 35. 
16 Malaya is the only exception where per capita 
income in 1960 was ~280. See Walinsky, L.J., The Planning and 
Execution of i!;conomic Development, NcGraw-Hill Series in 
International Development, 1963, · ·P· 190. 
. I·· .. 
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the average resident of Southeast Asia except in education, 
health and communication. The most important difficulty is 
that of low income itself which makes it impossible to 
devote a large enough proportion of income to increase 
productive:.capacity. Capital is lacking in sufficient amounts 
to make substantial investment possible. 
Accumulation of capital depends on savings and 
investment. According to E.C.A.F.E. estimates, the level of 
net saving from 1950-1959 was 15 percent of the Gross National 
Product in Thailand, and 13 percent in Burma (where one percent 
was foreign savings), which is quite high. Savings had been 
very low in Indonesia Which managed to save only 3.2 percent 
of the Gross National Product where .4 percent was foreign 
saving, and the Philippines saved only 3.6 percent where 1.6 
percent was foreign savings. 
TABLE 1.1 
Level of Net Saving, 1950-1959 (%of G.N.P.)17 
Country Foreign Net Domestic Net Total 
Saving Saving Saving 
Burma 0.1 13.6 13.7 
Federation of Malaya-10.2 17.5 7.3 
Indonesia 0.4 2.8 3.2 
Philippines 1.6 2.0 3.6 
Thailand 1.8 9.3 11.1 
l7 United Nations , Economic Survby of ~and 
~he Far East, 1961, E.C.A.F'.E., Bangkok, 19 2, p. 43. 
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Although there had been a sharp increase in Burma, 
it still remains inadequate for sustained growth. Domestic 
saving rose sharply in Burma and the rise in aggregate saving 
only reflects a change from foreign lending during 1951-1952 
to foreign borrowing in 1957-1959. Indonesia however, is 
facing a decline in the aggregate of domestic savings. In 
Thailand and the Philippines foreign investment has played 
a very considerable role amounting in each case to over 1 per-
cent of Gross National Product. Foreign saving provides under-
developed countries with additional resources for incre~sing 
their investment. However, the dependence on foreign saving 
should not become too permanent since the capital has to be 
repaid at a later stage and the repayment can become a restraint 
on further growth, 
Greater reliance might be put on d·Dmestic saving • 
However, domestic saving in Southeast Asia is influenced by 
low levels of per capita income. Population has some influence 
on the trend of saving; the higher the rate of population growth, 
the greater will be the proportion of a given increase in total 
output which has to be spent on consumption. Hence, less will 
be available for saving. There is also some correlation between 
exports and savings. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma 
and Malaysia, the rate of savings has risen with the rise in exportst1 
18 United Nations, Economic Surv6y of Asia ·and 
~he Far East, 1261, E.C.A. F .~., Bangkok, 19 2, chart 2-1, p. 53. 
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Thus in Southeast Asia, due to low per capita income, 
a high rate of population increase, and the falling trend of 
agricultural exports, the prospects for increased domestic 
saving are not too bright. The only way to increase national 
saving is by direct or indirect government intervention. The 
level of private saving can be influenced by fiscal and 
government measures and by expenditures in the public sector 
_itself. The government can encourage private household saving 
by encouraging banking habits, by fostering the growth of 
financial markets and by tax policies. However, in practice, 
these measures may not be too productive because in most parts 
of Southeast Asia, development of banking habits is a gradual 
change which involves a change in the social and cultural 
attitudes of the people; establishment of effective financial 
markets is difficult without widespread public support; and 
the distribution of income is such that the rrajority of the 
population is in the low group. In Southeast Asia, corporation 
income is a very small portion of national income; therefore, 
corporate saving plays a very minor role in total savings • 
However, savers are not necessarily investors. 
Prospective investors cannot proceed with their plans unless 
there are channels to assure a flow of saving to them. This 
is a problem in the typical underdeveloped country because 
agriculture dominates the economy and because often neither 
the government nor the private sector save enough to meet the 
I· , 
18 
cost of investment projects • . Further, agricultural finance 
is likely to become serious with the type of reforms that have 
been introduced in Southeast Asia.l9 There is a further 
problem of financing the small entrepreneur whose access to 
, financial institutions is limited. 
: ·. · 
:, ,: 
' ', 
. ' ~,_..,., ·. 
The government's ability to finance an all inclusive 
program of investment depends very largely on whether or not 
it is in a position to secure an excess of revenue over expend·· 
iture. The share of government in national product has 
increased in most countries of the region. Most of the 
countries in the region have incurred budget deficit in recent 
years and the size of the deficit had been increasing in all 
countries except in the Philippines and Thailand where emphasis 
has been on increasing the role of private sector. The 
Indonesian Government, though it did not increase its investment, 
was having financial difficulties in meeting expenditure during 
1957 to 1959 and government saving became negative. The reason 
for the deficit financing in this case is to be found in heavy 
military expenditures. It is evident then that a country can-
. not rely totally on the government's ability to invest or 
finance investment. In addition, investment in Southeast Asia 
has sometimes not been used in such a way as to obtain maximum 
potential benefit, ~lisallocation of investment has occurred 
19 United Nations Economic Survey of bsia and 
!he li'ar East, 1961, E.C. A.li'j,, Bangkok, 1962, p. 58. 
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in several directions by way of overemphasis on less essential 
infrastructure and on heavy industries such as the steel 
industry whose output is not yet badly needed in these small 
underdeveloped countries. 
Foreign exchange earnings play a most important role 
in capital accumulation and the problem of shortc.~e of foreign 
exchange is a very serious one in Southeast Asia. Capital 
accumulation on any scale is possible only with previous 
investment in productive uses, and the necessary machinery and 
equipment must be purchased from abroad with foreign exchange. 
There tends to be acute foreign exchange shortages in all 
Southeast Asian countries. rrhe main cause is the outflow of 
funds to pay for imports of goods and services and in the form 
of remittances abroad. There is believed to be a sizeable 
unofficial leakage of the latter in Southeast Asia especially 
in Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Hence, one dilemma faced by underdeveloped countries 
in Southeast Asia is scarcity of foreign exchange, and rather 
low capacity to obtain more. 'rhe problem can be overcome in 
part at least if economic assistance from advanced countries 
can be obtained. However, much foreign aid is high only in Laos, 
South Vietnam and Cambodia and is chiefly in the form of 
military assistance from the United States. The rest of South-
l· .. 
. .. , ~ .•. ,
. :>.:·~·.:·~ ... 
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east Asia receives very little foreign assistance,20 
C, POLITICAL PROBLEMS 
Krause had said "Political instability deters 
development because it raises uncertainties as to the future 
that serve to effect adversely economic and other decisions 
made in the present. 1121 Political instability is an outstanding 
factor in Southeast Asia, All the countries in the region, 
with the possible exception of Thailand and the Philippines, 
have problems of national integration, and regional, linguistic 
or religious clashes, frequent changes of government, external 
threats of aggression and internal threats of subversion so 
that energies cannot be fully turned to the drive for economic 
development. In Indonesia, for example, leaders have been so 
preoccupied with reconstruction, establishment of law and order, 
organizing government administration and jockeying for political 
power that they appeared to be less development minded than 
some countries in the region, That country's inherent 
tendencies towards instability, aggravated since the war by 
political pressures, have made "austerity" policies difficult 
to introduce and execute. In Burma, as Walinsky has said: 
20 d t • • A· d -- . d 1 d Benham, Fre eric, ~conomlc _!_ to Under eve ope 
Qountries, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, pp, 3'7-42. 
21 Krause, \valter, Economic Development, San 
Francisco, 1961, p. 49. 
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11It would be difficult to overestimate the extent to 
which insurrection and civil disorder retarded Burma's 
economic development. 1122 These factors were responsible 
for low production in extractive industries -- agriculture, 
mining and timber. Because of them, trains and inland water 
transport did not run at night, water supplies were frequently 
interrupted and oil pipelines were rendered completely 
inoperative. Thus, even in towns, production and commerce 
were adversely affected. 
The problems mentioned above are illustrative 
of the obstacles hindering the rate of growth of Southeast 
Asia, Countries in this region are in a very depressing 
situation. Although the region as a whole is not yet facing 
severe population problems, the rate of population growth 
is quite high. Gross domestic product per capita is low 
and investment not a high percentage of Gross National 
Product. 
22 \~alinsky, L.J., op. cit., p. 382. 
I· . 
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TABLE 1.2 
Southeast Asia Population, Gross Domestic 
Product and Investment Rates.23 
Country Population {1961) Gross National Product, 1960 
Total Rate of Density Per Investment 
millions Growth per sq. Capital % of G.N.P. 
mile ~ 
Burma 22.6 1.8 90 57 18 
Cambodia 5.0 2.2 70 106 14 
Indonesia 95.2 2.3 160 69 n.a. 
Laos 2.3 1.5 20 60 n.a. 
Malaya 7.1 3.2 140 280 n.a. 
Philippines 28.7 3.2 250 144 10 
Thailand 26.2 3.0 198 94 15 
Vietnam, S. 14.4 2.4 220 85 lO 
'rABLE 1.3 
Southeast Asian Countries Average Annual Aggregate 
Rates of Growth as Compared with Select Advanced Countries. 24 
1950-1959 
Burma 5.1 Taiwan 7.1 
Cambodia 4.0 Japan 9.1 
Indonesia 3.6 Germany 7.5 
Philippines 6.0 Austria 5.7 
'rhailand 5.0 United States 3.3 
23 S · · d R D. . . U S ource: Stat1st1cs an eport lVlSlon, •• 
Agency for International Development. 
24 TL _ • _L _ _ l !-.!_,_ _. ___ _ • r.\ _ _ ___ ___ .!__ Ct.~--"''"' " •"' .p,... ," J' t"t~'"l ')~,4 f-'ht::. 
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To promote rapid economic growth so as to catch 
up \~ith the western world, a drastic autonomous force is 
needed. The countries in the region can no longer take 
their own time in developing; a short cut method of growth 
is obviously necessary. The governments in the region have 
generally considered economic planning as the solution to 
their problems. Hence the following chapters will be devoted 
mainly on the effectiveness and the role of economic planning 
in Southeast Asia, taking Burma as a case study. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INCilliASIHG ROLE OF DEVELOP!wl£NT PLANNING 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
In the course of the last few years, the governments 
of the newly independent nations in Southeast Asia have become 
increasingly aware of their economic and social problems, and 
thus more concerned with policies which would minimize these 
problems. They believe that the changes required in their 
countries are structural, not marginal; therefore the price 
system alone cannot cope with their problems. The process 
of developing through private enterprise and the market mechanism 
takes time -- longer than most governments of underdeveloped 
countries choose to give. Thus government intervention in the 
private sector has been increasing with years. "It is not only 
socialists who are interested in planning. An increasing 
number of thinking men and women are coming to the conclusion 
that centralized control is a better method of organizing 
production, •••• They believe that planning is an essentially 
more efficient method of organizing economic life.nl 
A. NECESSITY OF GOVERN1f!ENT I NTERVENTION IN SOU1'HEAST ASIA • 
l. Failure of Market ~'Iechanism. 
Any economy, if left totally to the private sector, 
1 Durbin, ltF . r~i., Problems of Economic Planning, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1955, p. 45. 
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will lead to a non optimum allocation of resources, Investors 
in a market economy maximize private, not the social, net 
marginal product. External economies and diseconomies are 
not taken into account by the private sector, This leads 
to a divergence in the social and private cost. Thus government 
intervention is necessary to narrow the gap between social 
and private cost by using benefit cost calculations, shadow 
pricing, etc. 
All economies in actual life depart from the idealized 
conditions of perfect competition. This is particularly 
apparent in Southeast Asia. The lack of sufficient statistical 
data makes it difficult to obtain information as to consumer 
demand, The unstable economic and political situation makes 
forecasting almost impossible. Because of the low level of 
technological skill, information on alternative productive 
techniques is not easy to obtain. Entry into some occupations 
is limited by social factors and by lack of educational 
opportunities. Access to capital is limited due to the lack 
of capital markets • 
It is too big a risk, too costly and too time 
consuming to leave the economy entirely in the hands of the 
private enterprise operating under automatic market mechanism • 
"Complete Laisser-faire has few supporters and we need not 
waste time in flogging a dead horse. 112 i 
I 
I 2 Wilson, 'fhomas, Plannigg and Growth, London, 1964, P· 4. j 
I· .. 
"The functioning of the traditional economies left 
alone may perpetuate stagnation, wide fluctuation •••• the 
market mechanism with its imperfections cannot be solely relied 
on for mobilizing and utilising effectively the available 
resources to achieve maximum possible rate of growth. n3 
A planned economy is an economy with "open eyes." 
Because of its central authority it can survey the whole 
industrial field and is thus able to see what no individual 
producer can ever see and give weight to aspects like employment 
· · ... ~~::) and the infrastructure which are of no limited interest to 
. ·l ···.~~gr 
·:· ·:;~-~:~: 
· ::{~~~-
. ,:'.\'.'·:· 
. ~ .~:{f 
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2. Income Levels and Distribution. 
As discussed in the last chapter, many areas in 
Southeast Asia are currently in a vicious circle in which 
poverty generates a low rate of saving and investment. An 
autonomous force is needed to break this vicious circle. In 
Southeast Asia, public investment must make up a large fraction 
·,, ,; of the total investment, since the majority of population lives 
·::.' 
at the subsistence level. Most government investment is financed 
by borrowing either at home or abroad and with or without 
inflation.4· Capital requirement for growth has to be met by 
3 United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and 
lhe Far East, Vol. XII, No.3, December 1961, New York, 1961, p. 1. 
4 Mason, E.S., Economic Planning in Underdeveloped 
Areas; Government and Business, New York, 19bl, p. 7. 
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heavy taxation and public borrowing from domestic and fore~gn 
sources. This will call for a large public expenditure 
program which makes some sort of planning inevitable. 
Income distribution among economic classes and 
geographical regions as well, tends to be unequal, ~~rket 
mechanism which tends to make rich people richer and poor 
people pporer can never solve this problem. "Some form of 
government intervention to reduce income inequalities is 
essential in all countries, where regional differences are 
likely to be of greater importance. n5 
), Productivity of Factors of Production. 
Government intervention is required in expanding 
the productivity and availability of factors of production. 
To illustrate, labor may not be fully employed or natural 
resources may not be efficiently exploited due to lack of 
complementary investment. It is unlikely that simul~aneous 
expansion of complementary facilities in the early stages 
of development will take place without the direction and 
encouragement of the government. A spring into sustained growth 
requires a "big push" which essentially calls for careful planning 
of the expanded use of resources. This can only be undertaken 
by the government. 
5 lVlyrdal, G. , Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Begions, London, 1958, p. 26. 
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Institutional obstacles and ignorance tend to make 
the labor force immobile in many parts of Southeast Asia. 
This is particularly true in agriculture. In such countries, 
because marginal productivity for agricultural labor is usually 
zero or even negative, there is a problem of putting this labor 
to work more productively. Only government can bring about a 
better distribution of such resources~6 One private enterprise 
will not be concerned with the training of labor force for 
other employment. 
Social overhead capital and other preconditions 
necessary for development are lacking in many areas of South-
east Asia. There are insufficient roads, railways, airports, 
and port facilities. Power sources are lacking, capital formation 
is inadequate, the people are illiterate and public health poor. 
As discussed previously, social and religious customs and 
beliefs inhibit economic activity and prevent the development 
of a business and managerial class. "If it left to the automatic 
process of price mechanism, development -- if it does come --
will be measured in decades, not years. 117 The gap between 
per capita incomes in economically advanced countries and South-
east Asian countries has been widening rather than narrowing • 
6 See Mason, op. cit., p. 53. 
7 rvason, ibid., p. vi. 
: .: ~: .. 
. . 
.:·;,\::. 
. :":: ~~~ 
. ·~ ~. ' :·.~ 
; =·:Y::·(·j:· 
. ' .... :::~: . 
. ·.; .. ~~.;:!. 
. : . ~ .. ~ 
. · ."<Er~: · 
, \,.,_.: 
, :~~J~~· 
·I \ t .J.• 
! ·;:~· 
29 
The extremely rapid rate of growth achieved by Soviet Russia 
and China are not unnoticed by the countries in Southeast 
Asia. Hence government intervention in Southeast Asia is a 
matter of necessity rather than choice. 
Dr. Nkrumah is reported to have said: "Capitalism 
is too complicated for underdeveloped countries."$ The nine-
teenth century experience with development in the western world 
is not at all relevant to development in the underdeveloped 
areas today. The situation and conditions now are very different 
from that of 19th century. Widening of the gap between the 
advanced countries and underdeveloped countries and public 
pressures for haste, are two reasons sufficient to justify 
planned economic development, The case for planning is clear 
enough, provided the range of state activities be determined, 
The State will have to play a large role in the development of 
many underdeveloped countries, particularly in Southeast Asia. 
The critical and controversial issue is to decide how large 
the role of the government should be. 
B. THE ROLE AND NATURE OF ECONO~iiC DEVELOPlVlENT PLANNING. 
1. B!sic Reasons for Planned Economic Development in South-
~ast Asia. 
Post-war Southeast Asia had complete transformation 
in the political status because all the countries in the 
8 Wilson, T., Planning and Growth, London, 1964, p. 11. 
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territory gained their independence by 1959. Practically all 
countries in Southeast Asia are now receiving guidance from a 
plan of some sort for further development. 
All countries in the region with the exception of 
Thailand were formerly colonial territories. The present 
governments are filled with the popular enthusiasm that 
surrounds local heroes who succeeded in striking off the foreign 
tyrants' yoke: there is a natural disposition to look to such 
leaders for the economic as well as the political benefits of 
freedom. Therefore in Southeast Asia, although some current 
wealth and income are in private hands, governments planning 
is considerable in the attempt to set economic development in 
motion. 
Since their independence, there has been an 
~challenged assumption in Southeast Asian nations that 
development should ba planned. "They have newly won independence 
and are anxious to make their mark in the world. Ther are no 
longer satisfied to be hewers of wood and shawers of water --
producers of raw materials for industrialized nations, n9 With 
the development of mass media of communication such as radios, 
movies, newspapers and magazines these people have become 
economically awakened and have sta.rted comparing their lot 1'/ith 
that of people in industrially advanced areas • 
9 Mason, op. cit., p. vi. 
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Dr. R. Gadkil, one of India's eminent economists 
has said that "Today, it is only a very rich country like the 
United States which can afford to talk of free enterprise and 
even indulge in it and yet not suffer economically.nlO In 
Southeast Asia where resources are scarce, where efforts are 
being made to obtain rapid change and where change in the past 
has been slow and dragging, a short cut method is undoubtedly 
needed. 
"National unity is weak in a newly developing country 
and development plans may become an integrating force drawing 
the people of the country toward national unity as they are 
drawn into the development effort.ttll As discussed previously, 
most countries in Southeast Asia have problems of national 
integration, regional and linguistic clashes (rich regions, 
industrial and business areas and cities are flourishing and 
progressing rapidly due to external economies, backward and 
forward linkage, While some regions remain poor, primitive and 
neglected.) This is particularly true in Burma and Indonesia. 
People in the poor, backward regions are dissatisfied and 
frustrated and this results in economic social and political 
instability in these areas. Hence a preparation for development 
10 Gadkil, D.R., Economic Policy and Development, 
Poona, India, No. 30, p. 84. 
11 Ifugen, E.E., Plann~: Economic Development, 
Irwin's Series in Economics, Homewood, Illinois, 1963, p. 17 • 
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by national planners whose interest is for the development 
of every region in the country (i.e. structural change) is 
essential. 
Some cotmtries in Southeast Asia have become so 
involved with planned economic development mainly because 
11 the providers of international aid have usually been inclined 
to suppose that their money will be used to better effect when 
a national plan has been prepared,12 This is the attitude of 
the i~orld Bank and most advanced western countries, Planning 
in Laos, Veitnam, and Cambodia arose chiefly from the need to 
secure foreign aid.13 Their plans will be described briefly 
in the next section, 
11In countries like Burma and the Philippines 
economic planning resulted from the conviction that 'planning 
is essentially an attempt at working out rational solution 
of problems' and that planning means 'utilizing more effectively, 
the potential resources available to the conmunity', •• , In 
other countries such as Indonesia it came from the idea that 
a development plan would give more substance to political 
· · :.~::::·. 1' ndependence, 1114 
. : ..  ~·.:~· 
12 d G h -- . 11 o Wilson, 'l', , Planning ~ roi'lt , l'~~acm1 an oc 
Co,, Ltd., London, 1964, p. 2. 
13 United Nations, £conomic Survey of Asia and the 
K~ East, ~' E.C.A.F.E., Bangkok, 1957, Chapter 2, p. 49. 
14 United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and 
ihe Far East, Vol. XII, No. 3, December 1961, Nrw York, 1961, p.J.. 
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Most countries in Southeast Asia are in the 
transitional stage where the process of sustained growth 
has not started. Although it does not follow that in the 
region government domination and planning will inevitably 
bring about the achievement of self sustained growth, the 
forces favouring government initiation and domination are 
currently very strong, 
2. Emphasis on Government Role and Central Planning. 
Planning appears to have been widely accepted as 
an essential and pivotal means of guiding and accelerating 
economic development. ~iany countries of the region have 
accumulated considerable experience in economic development 
planning and some experience has also been gained in the 
implementation of such plans. In Southeast Asia, with the 
possible exception of North Vietnam, there are no completely 
planned and completely unplanned economies; planning is 
obviously a matter of degree. "Most countries in the region 
have different shades of "mixed economy" in which planning 
contains two important elements: the government's direct 
utilization of saving to carry out investment and management of 
resources for production, particularly in providing economic 
and social infrastructure, and the government's measures to 
facilitate, stimulate, guide and even control private activity.nl5 
16 United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and 
1he l!t East, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1961, Ne1t York 196r,-p:T.-
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The government and civil service are educated in a strong 
socialist tradition; thus the ideology of public intervention 
is powerful. Since independence, Southeast Asia has accorded 
an enthusiastic reception to national planning to regain as 
yet even the prewar standard of per capita incomes. In countries 
where comprehensive plans had not been formulated, individual 
development projects were increasingly provided for by the 
private sector with government encouragement. 
In the period after the war, the governments of the 
countries in the region have been forced to assume direct 
responsibility for pulling their economies out from stagnation. 
Efforts to break the vicious circle of low income, low productivity 
and low savings obviously have economic and social ramifications. 
For example, to raise productivity in agriculture, institutional 
changes in land ownership and the division of produce from land 
are essential. The provision of social overhead capital is 
not attractive to private enterprises because of its long 
period of gestation, and low pay-offs. Both the economic 
characteristics of investment and the social changes needed, 
make the predominance of the public sector inevitable where 
social capital is concerned. 
However, although all those countries have expressed 
the need for planning, the role of the government sector and 
the extent of planning varies from country to country • "In 
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the majority of the countries, the plans deal only or mainly 
with the major programmes to be implemented in public sector 
and in several of them lay down production and investment 
targets for the private sector. nl6 
The share of the government in the national allocation 
of the total supply of final good and services has increased 
considerably in all Southeast Asia countries. To illustrate, 
in Burma in 1951, total government expenditure was 14.4 percent 
and the net claim of the public sector was 13.4 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Expenditure, but had increased to 27.9 percent 
and 26.7 percent respectively in 1958, Government expenditure 
in Indonesia and Thailand was 16.2 percent and 10.8 percent 
respectively in 1951 but was increased to 19.7 percent and 
14.2 percent in 1958. The Philippines was the only country 
where little increase in government participation has occurred, 
16 
United,Nations,_, Economic Survby for Asia and 
th,?. Far East, 1960, E.C.A.F.l!i., Bangkok, 19 l, p. 54 • 
. ·I : . .. ., 
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TABLE 2.1 
Ehare of Public Sector in Gross National Expenditure.l7 
(% of gross national expenditure) 
Countrv 
" c.nd Year 
1951 
1958 
!ndonesia 
1950 
1958 
Thailand 
1950 
1958 
Philippines 
1950 
1958 
Total Government 
Expenditure 
14.4 
27.9 
16.2 
19.7 
10.8 
14.2 
11.2 
11.4 
Net Claim of the 
Public Sector 
13.4 
26.7 
16.2 
19.7 
10.8 
12.1 
10.0 
10.5 
.'~,'i;t: Statistics for other countries are not available • 
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':;::;!:: Although the impor·~ance of the role of the government is 
realized, the share of the government in Southeast Asian 
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17 Source - United Nat ions, ~conomic Survey of Asia and 
the Far East, 1960, E.C.A.F.E. Bangkok, 1961, p. 54. 
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countries (with the exception of Burma) is not so large as in 
the advanced countries. 11In countries with per capita incomes 
of less than ~~100, the share of government runs from six or 
seven to about .fifteen percent. In \'/estern countries with 
per capita incomes of say :j~ 800 and above the figure customarily 
varies between 20 and 30 percent.nlB The reason is the low 
taxable capacity of the population. 
3. General Categories of Planning. 
Economic planning can broadly be divided into two 
categories. One category is where the state seeks to ensure 
that the general economic environment is favourable to growth; 
this takes the form of creating the environment in which 
business enterprises operate, laying down the rules, building 
the necessary institutions and preserving law and order. 
E,O. Reischauer comments that the state 1s "chief contribution 
was in providing unity and stability, a system of universal 
education and specific institutions such as modern economic 
and banking systems.nl9 Another category is that the government 
may propose a certain rate of growth for total output and may 
go on to prescribe rate of growth for particular industries. 
11his is planning by means of targets and programmes. In this 
category, the government may work towards the target just by 
18 l~'"~ason, op. cit., p. 5 • 
l9 Reischauer, ~.0., Journal of Economic History, 
September 1955, New York, p. 308, 
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planning a series of investments for public sector, and leave 
the rest to the private sector. This concept is represented 
by Indonesia today although some projects regarded these as 
being in the public sector fall within the scope of private 
sector in other countries.20 Or, the government may interfere 
more actively as is the case in Burma. 
Most countries in Southeast Asia seem to assume 
that at least some targets for output will be helpful. Even 
countries which are adopting the free enterprise system such 
as the Philippines have targets for the increase in the level 
of employment, equalizing the distribution of income expanding 
and diversifying production exports etc. in their plans, 21 
and work towards these targets by improving taxation, educational 
levels and the transport and communication system etc. In 
countries such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where targets 
were set, plans became a mere expression of desire of the 
governments, 
"Planning of this type (by means of target and 
goals) must not be regarded as an alternative to planning 
of the first type (creating a general economic environment 
for growth). Planning of the first kind will always be ~equir.ed, 
2° Kindlebeger, C.P., op. cit., p. 140. 
21 National Economic Council, The Five-Year Economic 
~nd Social Development Program, For FY. 1957-1961, Manila, 1957, 
pp. 4-5. 
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however, much or little there may be of the second type. n22 
There is little use in preparing ambitious targets for output 
if nothing is done to ensure the general economic environment 
favourable to growth. 
f. 4. General Description of Plans in Southeast 1\B~. 
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To many countries in Southeast Asia, the first plan 
usually represented national aspirations and, as it brought 
into focus national objectives of development, it tended to 
.arouse enthusiasm of the people and to enlist their support 
towards the common goal. 
By 1960, all the countries in Southeast Asia, with 
the exception of Thailand, were operating on a planned basis. 23 
However, adoption of planning in the region is essentially a 
post-war phenomenon. The first development plan formulation in 
the region was started by the Philippines and Burma in 1948. 
The duration of the plans ranges from two years (Cambodia and 
Southern Vietnam) to eight years (Burma). The scope and 
comprehensiveness of plans vary widely among countries of the 
region. The first plans were almost invariably a swnmation of 
a number of individual projects in the public sector many of 
which are already implemented. Some of the plans contain 
certain targets tiUCh as rate of growth in national income 
22 v~ilson, 1'., op. cit., p. 11 • 
23 
'rhailand started formal economic planning in 1961. 
. I . ' · ; . .' ..... 
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(Burma) and the extent of absorption of the unemployed (the 
Philippines) and others such as Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam 
do not provide targets due to lack of necessary statistical 
data on national income and employment.24 
(a) Planning Agencies. 
In most cases the broad policy aspect of planning 
is entrusted to a specially constituted board usually called 
a council (e.g., National Economic Council). iviembership 
consists of Cabinet Ministers and other top government 
officials with the Prime Minister usually acting as chairman,25 
Planning agencies or units - variously referred to as planning 
commissions, planning boards, planning secretariats -are 
given responsibility for drafting the plan and making subsequent 
progress reports. Although in most cases the technical experts 
in the planning agency are permanent employees, the agencies 
in some countries have utilized the services of short term 
: y:;Th\: consultants from various ministries or from abroad. The latter 
... ; . ...,; .. 
: : ~:=lf 
:_ ·!s.Et,: has been done for example in Burma and Indonesia. 
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(b) Coverage. 
Plans in the region differ in their coverage. The 
24 United Nations, Economic Bulletin .f££ Asia and 
the Far East, Vol. XII, No. 3, December 1961, New York, 1961, 
25 United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the 
~ar East, 122£, E.C.A.F.E., Bangkok, 1957, p. 47. 
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countries in the region can be divided into three groups: 
"those which hav\9 integrated multisectoral plans embodying 
plan objectives and policy and instruments; · those which have 
well formulated plans mainly for public investment, mostly 
in social overhead; and those \mich have a string of isolated 
projects!'26 The Philippines 1 planning machinery falls in the 
first group as the country has sufficient statistics and well-
formed bodies concerned in varying degrees with the formulation, 
coordination, and implementation of planning. Countries such 
as Burma during the late 1950's would ~all under group two; 
Cambodia would fall under group three as its planning agencies 
appear to have a rather limited scope with respect to formulation, 
coordination and execution of plans. For instance, in Burma 
during that period, the Ministry of National Planning was 
mainly concerned with the implementation of programmes through 
the annual budgeting process rather than with the formulation 
of plar1s, 27 "In Cambodia, the Ministry of Planning is in 
charge of preparing plans but due to lack of proper coordination 
there is a great divergence between the Ministry's targets 
and those put forward by the govermnent departments which are 
supposed to carry on. 1128 
26 United Nations, E.C.A.F,E., Formulating Industrial 
Development Programme (Development Programming Techniques Series 
No, 2; Bangkok, 1961), p. 102. 
27 Since the failure of the Eight Year Plan, the 
Burmese Government decided to change their method of planning. 
2$ Formulating Industrial Development Programm~, 
op, cit •. u. 104. 
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(c) Major Objectives and Effectiveness. 
In most countries in the region, the achievement mf 
a certain rate of economic growth was the major objective. 
Other objectives were regarded as a subordinate to the main 
one. However, some countries, for example Indonesia (and 
Thailand after 1960), placed more emphasis on internal economic 
stability than on growth. In countries where population pressure 
is severe (e.g. the Philippines) more stress was laid on 
employment objectives. 
In addition to the broad aims mentioned above the 
development plans of the countries in the region emphasized 
greater agricultural output, development of basic facilities, 
rapid industrialization and more employment. Generally, most 
plans now in effect contain a projection of the national and 
per capita income over the period. 
Cambodia's Two Year Plan, formulated in 1955 for the 
two year development period of 1956/ 57, stated its object ives 
as: to provide basic social and economic facil ities, increase 
output of rice, undertake a general economic survey, and to 
attract foreign investment. '£his plan relied too much on 
foreign investment and aid because 90 percent of the pl anned 
expenditure was to be financed by the United States, French 
and Chinese aid. It provided for an increase in total outlay 
of 3,500 million riel s (i.e . :!~108 million United States) --
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TABLE 2-2 
Southeast Asian Countries: Economic Development Plans; 
Country Name of Plan 
Cambodia Two Year Equipment Plan 
Vietnam ·Two Year Development Plan 
(Southern) for Industry; Three Year 
Plan for Agriculture 
Burma The Eight Year Plan; 
The Four Year Plan 
Indonesia The Five Year Plan 
The Philippines Rehabilitation and Develop-
ment Programme; 
The Five Year Economic 
Development Programme; 
The Three Year Programme 
for Social Development 
Laos First Five Year Plan 
Malaya 'fhe First Five Year Plan 
The Second Five Year Plan 
Thaiiliand 
Date of Adoption 
December 23, 1955 
Industry, 1954 
Agriculture, 1953 
1952 
1956 
January, 1956 
1948 
1956 
1959 
1954 
1956 
After 1960 
Aft,er 1960 
Period 
Covered 
1956/57 
Industry 
1955/56 
Agricult 
1955/57 
1962/60 
1956/60 
Jan. 195 
Dec. 196 
1956/57 
1960/61 
1959/60 
1961/62 
1954/59 
1956/60 
29 Unit ed Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 1ast, 1956, E,G.A.F.B. : 
•:r : . ... . 
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TABLE 2-2 
~ast Asian Countries: Economic Development Plans29 
f Plan Date of Adoption Period Policy Board Planning 
Covered Agencies 
1ipment Plan December 23, 1955 1956/57 Supreme Council for National 
Planning and National Planning 
Development Board 
velopment Plan Industry 1 1954 Industry, Planning 
r; Three Year Agriculture, 1953 1955/56 Bureau 
riculture Agriculture, 
1955/57 
ear Plan; 1952 1962/60 Economic & Social lV1inistry of 
s.r Plan 1956 1956/60 Board National Planning 
3.r Plan January, 1956 Jan. 1956 - Economic & Planning National 
Dec. 1961 Council Planning Bureau 
ion and Develop- National Economic Office of 
mme; 1948 Council National 
ar Economic Planning 
Programme; 1956 1956/57 to 
ear Programme 1960/ 61 
Development 1959 1959/60 to 
1961/62 
Year Plan 1954 1954/59 Iviinistries 
ive Year Plan 1956 1956/ 60 
Five Year Plan After 1960 
After 1960 
.rvey of Asia and the Far ~ast, 1956, E.C.A.F.B., Bangkok, 1957, P· 46. 
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JB percent of the amount was for the improvement in production; 
38 percent for reconstruction and rehabilitations; 19 percent 
for social overhead expenditure; and 5 percent ·for research surveys 
and development of tourism.30 It is difficult to evaluate the 
success or failure of Cambodia's plan because the plan was not 
well organised, no detail information was provided and no 
targets stated. 
~fter achieving its independence in 1954, various 
ministries in Laos redrafted the First Five Year Plan.3l 
However, due to lack of basic data and trained personnel, no 
targets were set. Thus their Plan was just an attempt to 
develop their country on a systematic planned basis, and the 
expression of their desires. Although external aid has been 
received on a substantial scale, particularly from France and 
the United States, full and effective resources utilization 
for the country's development is likely to take a long time • 
• 
To diversify exports, and to increase productivity 
and income in the rural areas the Federal Government of 
~:ialaya embarked on the General Development Plan for the five 
year period 1956 to 1960. This plan envisaged total investment 
30 United Nations, Economic Survey for Asia and the 
!9! East, 1..22§, l!:.C.A.F,E., Bangkok, 1957, p. 69. 
)l Ibid., p. 133. 
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by the public authorities of N'ialayan ~;;1,150 million (i.e., 
approximately :~383 million, United States) about double the 
amount invested during 1951-1955. However, actual investment 
fell short of the target by about 15 percent due to financial 
stringency, lack of skilled personnel and the world wide recession 
of 195B-59, although amounts allocated to projects which were 
; iven top priority such as public utilities, rubber planting, 
land development and social overhead facilities were fully spent. 
Indonesia's Five Year Plan32 (January 1956-December 
1960) was designed mainly to raise living standards by increased 
production, and to change the structure of the economy in a way 
consistent with independence. Indonesia's plan, unlike those 
in other countries has national income targets until 1975. 
The plan was rather modest for a country which was preparing 
for its take off. Net capital format ion was estimated at 6 per-
cent per annum. With an incremental capital output ratio of 
2:1, the expected annual increase in Gross National Product 
was 3 percent. As population growth was estimated at l. 7 per-
cent per annum, increase in per capita would be only 1.3 percent 
per annum. It v~as also suggested t hat 40 percent of the 
increased income was to be set aside every year for new capital 
formation so as to raise the standard of l iving. At the end 
32 Garis-Garis Besar lient,jagg, Pemban unan Lima Tahun, 
1956-60 (Djakarta , Biro Perantjang Negara, 195 • 
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of the first Five Year Plan (i.e., 1960) capital formation 
was expected to reach the level of about $ percent of the 
national income. By 1965 (at the end of the _Second ~'ive Year 
Plan~ it was hoped that capital formation will reach 12 percent 
of the National Income. Thus by 1975, the level of capital 
formation of 20 percent of the National Income was expected. 
At that time, the increase in N&tional Income should approximate 
5 percent per annum or an increase in per capita income of 
3 percent. 
Indonesia's planning looks impressive on paper. 
However, its estimate of future government financial resources, 
the list of projects related to expected revenues, and certain 
projections of private investment are admittedly guess work. 
Planning difficulties have arisen due to the lack of effective 
control over government expenditure (and consequently over 
the supply of money), and lack of coordination of the Planning 
Board and inexperienced planning staffs.33 
The Philippines Five Year Economic Development 
Proframme34 and Three Year Program for Social Development35 
were aimed at raising the levels of production, employment and 
33 See Mason, op. cit., p. 62. 
34 National Economic Council, The Five Year Economic 
_gnd Social Development Program for FY 1957-19hl,I~'ianila, 1957. 
35 National Economic Council, Th~ Three Year Program 
.fgr Economic ,gnd Social Development FY 1959Ql96!,, l~ianila, 1959. 
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real income. The plans put emphasis on balanced growth, 
expansion in domestic demand, diversification of exports, 
and the proper role of the private sector. The Five Year Plan 
aimed at an annual rate of growth in aggregate national ' income 
of 6 percent. This, however, was subjected to periodic 
revisions with increased experience and availability of 
information. Agriculture production was expected to increase 
by 4 percent, manufacturing industry at 14 percent and mining 
industry at 8 percent per year. 
Total investment (public and private ) was estimated 
to amount peso 5.2 billion ( ~2.6 billion United States); peso 
3.2 of private investment and 2 billion of investment in public 
secoor was proposed. Recommendations were made to improv~ the 
monetary and fiscal policy and to create incentives for private 
investors. Investment in the public sector would require 
[~~··,:;;}J£{:*.~ ;:: ·:::.:-:!~~:, ~327 million (United States) in foreign exchange, some 33 per-
, ....... ,~ ..... ........ 
~ .... ~.-...  ! .... -.1 ·~:.:;\.". 
i .;·,x.'~0 
j · •. . :·;;,·~y; 
I ~ - · •. '.•:<: .. ·.~.:: 
cent of the total public expenditure. Should the proposed 
investment pattern occur, some 300,000 new jobs \'lould be 
generated annually, or a total of 1.5 million jobs from 
1957-1961. 
The Phillipines' plans, on the whole, were not a 
complete success as the National Economic Council of the 
Philippines was a mixed representation of Congress and Executives, 
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sought his own self interest and there was no coordination 
among them. However, the failure of the plans does not mean 
that there was no central direction of development in the 
Philippines. Planning of a sort was carried out. 
According to Professor Iviason, 11The Burmese experience 
with planned development is more promising than the Philippines 
or Indonesia, and •••• in the course of time the Burmese will 
possess an effective planning process. However, they still have 
a long way to go.n36 Burma's plan was designed mainly to 
restore postwar level of production and to develop basic facilities. 
Description and evaluation of Burma's plans require a separate 
study which is the content of the next chapter. 
On the whole, none of the plans in Southeast Asia 
met with total success although they did not meet with total 
failure. Experience shows that, in such underdeveloped 
countrie~, \..here planning is very necessary, it is even more 
difficult to execute. A comprehensiveness of a plan depends 
chiefly on the stage of development of the economy, the 
availability of statistical data and the supply of qualified 
planners. 
36 ~~son, op. cit. p. 64. 
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CHAPTER III 
'l,HE ROLE OF ECONOMIC PLANNING IN BURiviA 
A. BRIEl!"' DESCRIPTIOa AND HIS'fORY OF BURl~iA 
Walinsky described Burma as "shaped roughly like a 
diamond kite some 500 miles across and 800 miles from north 
to south •••• bounded on the land side by East Pakistan, India, 
China, Laos and Thailand. 111 Burma has an area of 262,000 
square miles with population of nearly 23 million. 
Burma was under the British rule from 1885 to 1947 
apart from about 2 years Japanese occupation during the Second 
World War. The earliest British administrators in Burma 
adopted a policy of free enterprise, that is the laissez faire 
policy. There was very little government interference in the 
economic affairs, except to collect taxes, maintain law and 
order and a certain amount of social improvement. To the 
British, Burma was a "business concern and a profitab~.e one. 112 
Burma is rich in agricultural, fishery, forestry, 
mineral and water resources; the most important of which are 
food resources. She has never had a serious food problem. 
Her fertile land makes growing of rice the most important 
1 Walinsky, L.J., Economic Development of Burm~ 
1251-1960, New York, 1962, p. J, 
2 Furnival, J.S. "Twilight in Burma," Pacifig_ 
~ffairs, lfJarch 1%9, pp. 4-5. 
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single occupation. Burma was and still is the world's largest 
exporter of this important staple food. In addition to fertile 
farm lands, she has rich and diversified mineral resources, 
vast forests, natural waterways and power sites, a growing 
population and labor force and evidence of the capacities of 
her people for education and work.3 
Burma was the third nation in the British Empire 
to attain independence and became a federally organized . 
republic on January 4, 1948. The reason for this urgent 
demand for independence by the Burmese was that the people, 
especially students and "white collar class" of middle echelon 
Burmese, realized that although Burma was a relatively rich 
country and a profitable colony, the Burman "remained relatively 
poor11 .4 The social services of health and education left much 
to be desired in quality and distribution throughout .the country. 
For example in the 1940's, two-thirds of the rice lands were 
held by non-resident landlords.5 There were other political 
and administrative complaints. Thus in 1947, although the 
Burmese were offered for consideration membership in the Common-
wealth, the Burmese, led by the A.F.P.F.L. (Anti-Facist People's 
3 Walinsky, op. cit., p. 88. 
4 Trager, Frank N.! Building~ Welfare State in 
~~ 1948-1956, New York 195~, p. 2 • 
5 Harvey, G.~., British Rule in Burma, 1824-1942, 
London, 1946, pp. 59, 66 • 
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Freedom League) chose complete independ·ence. 
B. 'rHE POST-WAR ECONOIHC SITUATION IN BUffiJiA 
Burma had suffered greatly during the Second World 
War. Railways and waterways were stripped of their rolling 
and floating stock, mines flooded, oil refineries dynamited, 
oil wells sabotaged, bridges blown up, ports blocked, roads 
damaged and power stations were demolished. l'-1onetary estimates 
of the extent of damage have varied considerably. However, a 
paper prepared by Robert R. Nathan Associates, consulting 
economists to the government, concluded that "approximately 
Kyats 14 billion (nearly ~3 billion United States) in current 
prices would seem to be a reasonable statement of Burma's 
physical damages. 116 
The immediate post-war period, the production in 
almost all the major industries of Burma was very low (see 
table), The reasons for this decline in total output were 
the actual destruction of capital and equipment in the course of 
military activities; the stoppage of many industries during 
(}~;&£~ the war because of wartime conditions and insecurity; and the 
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isolation of Burma during the war which reduced the demand for 
t he main crops. Also 2 million acres of paddy lands had 
6 Robert R, Nathan Associat es Inc., Burma's 
£reparation Claims Against Japan (Rangoon, June 1954), p. 2. 
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reverted to jungles and hundreds of thousands of agricultural 
refugees in the towns.7 
TABLE 3.1 
Gross National Product and Incomes 
(Estimates Rs. million) 
Year 38-39 46-47 47-48 4B-49 49-50 
G.N.P, at 1938-39 
Prices 
Agriculture 
Ivlining 
Timber 
Gross National Income 
at 1938-39 prices 
Percent of 1938-39 
1,190 
513 
128 
61 
1,112 
100 
Note: Approx. Rs. 5 : ~1. (U.S.) 
707 
314 
2 
27 
669 
60 
879 795 691 
389 369 317 
6 7 3 
35 23 16 
826 791 651 
74 7l 58 
Thus national income immediately after the war was 
less than two-thirds of the prewar level. Income per head had 
fallen still more due to a rise in population since the war. 
This was the situation when General Aung San went 
to London in January 1947 to sign an agreement which ensured 
independence within one year. When Burma became independent 
7 Walinsky, op. cit., p. 59. 
B IViinistry of National Planning, Economic Survey 
2£ Burma, 12il, Rangoon, 1952, Table 111, p. 3 • 
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on the 4th January 1948, the Constitution Assembly approved 
the written Constitution which stated that Bunna would have 
a planned economic development dedicated to the material and 
cultural uplift of the people, and to their protection from 
monopoly exploitation, insecurity and abuse. Soon after 
independence, the National Government adopted an independent 
economic policy aimed at establishing a socialist state in 
Burma and promoting economic development on a planned basis. 
Great emphasis was laid on the industrialization of the country 
because it vas considered that a predominantly agricultural 
economy tended to have low productivity and low per capita 
incomes. And, of course, an agricultural economy which is a net 
exporter tends to be unstable due to economic fluctuations 
in the rest of the world. It was felt that industrialization 
would increase the productivity of labor and raise the standard 
of living of the people. 
For the Bunnese leaders, the basic objective of 
overall economic planning "is none other than a steady and 
energetic effort to be exerted by us to exploit the immense 
natural wealth of the country to benefit the citizens totally 
to create conditions of contentment and hapiness. 119 In a 
government publication, the view was expressed that the aim 
of the tl'OVernment was 11 to create a nei'f foundation for our new 
0 
9 U Nu, Towa.rds ~ \'lelfare State, Hangoon 1952, p. 36. 
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society, an economy capable of dynamic growth for the indefinite 
future. nlO These tasks, however, were quite stupendous because 
war damage was extensive in Burma. Great portions of her 
natural resources were already exploited and the nation at 
that time did not possess the technical, administrative and 
financial resources for building a modern economic society ,ll 
C. THE T·wo YEAR PLAN 
Since independence, importance of planning has been 
stressed and economic planning has played a major role in the 
development of Burma. The Burmese Government firmly believed 
in economic planning as an effective and short cut way of 
achieving growth. The Constitution openly stated that 11the 
economic life of the Union shall be planned with the aim of 
increasing the public wealth, of improving the material 
conditions of the people and raising their cultural level, of 
consolidating the independence of the Union and strengthening 
its defensive capacity.nl2 
The first major conference on planning was held .by 
the late General Aung San at the Sorrento Villa, in Rangoon 
10 Pyidawtha: The New~~' Rangoon, 1954, p. 12. 
11 ' Trager, op. cit., p. b. 
12 The Constitution of the Union of ~' Rangoon 
1948, Section 41. 
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June 1947 to discuss the problems of rehabilitation of Burmese 
economy to its prewar level. The Conference was divided into 
the Statistical Section, the Planning Section, the Finance 
Section, the Ways and Means Section, and the Co-ordination 
Section. A National Planning Board was set up to survey the 
economic resources of the country, and to draw up an overall 
plan as well as sectoral and departmental plans. 
The tragic assasination of the national heroes, 
including General Aung San, left the implementation of 
"Sorrento Plans" to the Economic Planning Board (a subsidiary 
of the National Planning Board).l3 This Economic Planning 
Board was charged with preparing a restricted Two Year Plan 
of Economic Development. They drew up the Plan within a 
short space of two months and announced the Plan in April, 
1948. "The Plan incorporates most of the valuable materials 
from the 'Sorrento Plans', but not all •••• nl4 
The Two Year Plan of 1948 was, until 1960, the 
first and the only attempt at comprehensive. economic planning 
! /::i![~~~~ made by independent Burma without any assistance from foreign 
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advisors. It was Burma's first attempt to formulate specific 
ways and means of achieving the principles and goals stated in 
l3 'l'het Tun J }:, Review of Economic Planning in Burma, 
B.R.S.F.P., January 19o0, Rangoon, 1~ p. 490 • 
l4 Economic Planning Board, T\'10 Year Plan of Economic 
Development for Burma, Rangoon, 194S , p. l. 
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the Constitution. 
The overall aim of the plan was vague. It stated 
its aim as "the maximum development which is considered 
practicable during the next two years (meaning 1949, 1950), 
bearing in mind the limitations of men and resources.ul5 
However, in effect the planned period extended beyond the 
immediate two years. The planners stated that the Two Year 
Plan was to lay down the foundations of a planned economy. 
As these plans were made immediately at the time of the 
granting of independence there was not much time to study 
the available resources and potentialities in the country. 
1. Sector Targets 
(a) Agriculture. 
The Plan set 1951-52 as a target date for regaining 
the prev1ar rice position in production and export. In addition 
to this target, it stipulated three basic policies of the 
Government: (1) to eliminate landlordism and redistribute land, 
(2) to insure the cultivators a fair share of its produce and 
(3) to become self-sufficient in a number of agricultural products • 
In order to carry out their pomicies, the Plan 
recommended, firstly, the allocation of unrented land to tenant 
15 Two Year Plan, op. cit., p. 2 • 
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farms and the provision of government loans for reclamation 
of paddy lands which had reverted to jungles; and secondly, 
the formation of a central state agricultural bank for crop 
loans, cattle loans, improvement loans and cattle insurance. 
Proposals were made for the granting of at least K50 million 
( ~:ao.5 million, United States) of credit for the 1948-49 
season,l6 
Targets were also set for other agricultural products, 
but no recommendations were made as to how these targets were 
to be achieved. 
(b) Industrial and Power Development. 
In connection with industrial development it was 
suggested that all basic industries be established and developed 
as st.ate enterprises. For consumer goods industries, "first 
consideration was to be given to their development on a State 
owned basis. nl7 
The need for resource surveys was recognized and 
the rehabilitation of former industries was given high priority. 
'rhe Plan specifically recommended the immediate setting up of: 
16 Walinsky, op. cit., p. 65. 
l7 'l'wo Year Plan, o_p. cit., P· 5. 
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a tile factory, paper and chemical industries, a spinning and 
weaving factory, a sugar factory, saw mills, a soap factory, 
pilot dairy farms, a coal mine in Kalewa, a steel rolling mill, 
rice mills, a rubber factory and pottery works. 
Proposals regarding electric power development were 
very ambitious. Emphasis was placed on hydroelectric power 
as a source of energy with recommendations for surveys of 
Bawgata Chaung and Singdin Falls in Akyab district. The 
creation of an Electric Supply Board and the supply of 
electricity from the various state owned generating stations 
for a number of towns were also proposed. 
(c) Other Fields. 
In forestry, one aim was to achieve prewar output 
by 1951-52. It was also hoped t hat complete nationalization 
of forests and the formation of a State Timber Board to control 
the milling and export of timber would be carried out. 
The Plan mentioned the urgent need to restore 
transport and communication facilities, extension of railway 
lines, and the highway networks and the development of air 
transport, 'rhe Burmanization of services in the Inland \1ater 
Transport and Communication Departments of t he Government was 
also stressed, 
In the field of labor, the plan called for the 
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strengthening of the Factory Inspectorate, the opening of more 
labor offices and employment exchange, establishment of wage 
councils, the publication of a Labour Gazette and the 
registration of technical and seientific personnel. 
'l'he Plan recognized the need for financial 
reconstruction and stated that "financial policy shall be 
brought in line with the general policy of state socialism. nl8 
Cre~tion of a state commercial bank, inaugu1ation of a decimal 
currency, the reorganization of the audit department, a savings 
campaign and compulsory life insurance for state employees, 
were recommended. 
2. Effectiveness of the Plan. 
The Two Year Plan was more or less an expression of 
wishes of the national leaders of the desirabilitj of regaining 
the prewar level of living in the nation, rather than a plan 
with methods for accomplishing this goal. No aggregate targets 
for output and investment were set. Although the plan listed 
the projects the government wished to establish, no attempt 
was made to estinate the available source of funds to finance 
those projects. The Plan was naive in its expectations as to 
what might be achieved \dthin a two year period and made no 
attempt to appraise or provide for the cost of programmes 
18 Two Year Plan, op. cit., p. 12. 
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recommended. It was merely a mixture of aims and projects 
rather than a systematic comprehensive plan. 
Some policies and targets were too ambitious for a 
newly independent nation greatly damaged as it was by war. 
The target date (which was 1951) set for the prewar level of 
production was unrealistic. In effect, the planned period 
went beyond the immediate two years. The Land Hationalization 
Act which was passed in 1948 had tm be passed again and was 
implemented only in 1953. The Plan's proposal to set up a 
State Agricultural Bank was implemented also in 1953. Regarding 
the plan's target for teak, actual production and export 
eventually were far behind the target due to several reasons. 
These included the sensitivity of the extraction process, 
lack of law and order, and the loss of teak markets during 
the war. Even in 1958-59 teak export was only one third of 
the prewar level. In the field of industry, all the projects 
1 is ted in the plan were implemented at dates much later than 
schedule. Although the surveys for power development were 
carried out to a limited extent, they did not lead to 
implementation. 
Thus, the Two Year Plan was merely a first attempt 
to develop the country on a planned basis. It should be 
emphasized that although the Plan was officially announced, 
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insurrection in 1949 which nearly destroyed the National 
Government. 
Any progress which might have been made under the 
Two Year Plan was stopped by the insurrection. The economic 
well being of the country was adversely affected. By the end 
of 1950, it was estimated that the damage inflicted by the 
insurrection to public property amounted to K425 million 
(i.e., $8.5 million, United States), extra defense expenditure 
amounted to Kl,OOO million ($200 million, United States) and 
that damage to private property amounted to Kl,OOO million.l9 
1' otal output which had risen from 61 percent of the prewar 
level in 1946-47 to 72 percent the following year declined to 
65 percent in 1949/50. 20 Thus four years after the war, the 
Burmese economy was driven back to the early post war output 
level. 
To sum up, it is appropriate to quote U Thet Tun: 
"The Two Year Plan of Economic Development, drawn up during 
a short space of two months, admittedly handicapped by 
inadequacy of data and knowledge of country's resources, was 
not a fully fledged plan in the true sense of the word. It 
was more of an enunciation of the economic aspirations of a 
newly born state and of the economic principles to guide the 
19 Walinsky, op. cit.,p. 69. 
20 V/alinsky, ibid. . 1 
' : ~ 
! · 
,·: 
i 
! • 
~ ' 
t:: 
I ··· I '· 
• 
. ~ 
62 
process of advancement towards those objectives •••• The Plan, 
of course, was never implemented as scheduled as country wide 
insurrection broke out soon after the announcement of the Plan. 
Even if it had been, it is hard to see how the ambitious targets 
of the Plan in agriculture and forestry sectors could have been 
achieved,tt21 
D. INCRl!;ASING ROL£ OF ECOHOiviiC PLANNING 
To demonstrate the national importance of economic 
planning, the Prime Iviinister took charge of the portfolio of 
the Ministry of Planning and assumed the presidency of the 
National Planning Board. The Board was assigned the duty of 
surveying the resources of the country, evolving plans for 
its economic development, and coordinating and supervising 
the activities of the I·linistries ·in the execution of the plans. 
It was presided over by the Prime 111inister and members included 
~iinisters of the Government. However, the National :nanning 
Board could not operate effeciently and effectively, mainly 
because of its large size. The Board soon became defunct and 
remained merely as an accommodation centre for statistical, 
economic and industrial research workers. In order to take 
over some of the functions of the National Planning Board, the 
Economic Council was formed under the chairmanship of the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce. The duties of the council 
21 Thet Tun, op. cit., p. 492. 
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were "to formulate and submit government plan.s and advice, 
and make recommendations in economic matters; and to submit 
plans and programmes for the nationalization of industries.n22 
During the first half of 1951, the Planning Ministry 
invited a group of British economists to assist both the 
lliinistry of National Planning and the Union Bank of Burma. 
The exp~rts made the following recommendations:23 
1. An economic survey to acquire basic statistical data. 
2. A study of the types of industry suitable to Burma. 
3. A long term plan for economic development. 
4. Agricultural rehabilitation and the provision of social capital. 
5. A survey of man pm>~er resources. 
6, Preparation of a new budget to accelerate departmental 
planning and spending. 
7. Reform of the currency system. 
8. Revising import control machinery. 
As well, in a short period of time, the experts did 
some groundworl< for planning in the way of national income 
estimation. Their results were the publication of the first 
"Economic Survey of Burma" and of "Conference Papers on Current 
Economic Problems of Burma" in 1951. 
22 See Constitution of Economic Council, Government 
Printing Press, Rangoon, 1950. 
23 Ministry of National Planning, Conference Papers 
Qn Current Economic Problems of Burn1a, 1221, Rangoon 1951, pp.2,7,8. 
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E. THE EIGHT YEAR PLAN 
1. Description. 
After the survey of British economists, the Burmese 
Government engaged the Knappen, Tippetts, Abbet engineering 
firm; Pierce ~·Janagement Inc. ,\·Mining engineering firm; and 
Robert R. Nathan Associates Inc., consulting economists, in 
late 1951. 'rhese firms were engaged with funds provided under 
the U.S. Technical Cooperation Programme to draw a comprehensive 
economic plan for Burma. Their contract included the preparation 
of economic and engineering surveys; the preliminary draft was 
to be submitted in early 1952 and the final draft in August 
1953. 
In January 1952, the group of consultants submitted 
a preliminary report and reconwendations called the K,T.A. 
Report. Most of their recommendations were later endorsed 
by the Government at the "All Burma Pyidawtha Conference" 
in August 1952. In August 1953, the consultants submitted 
their final Comprehensive Report on the economic and engineering 
development of Burma. Hence the K,T,A, (Knappen, Tippett, 
Abbett) Plan, which was also known as the Pyidawtha or the 
Eight Year Plan, set its plan period as January 1952 to 
September 1959. Recommendations of various groups including 
U.nited Nations technicians, Social Service Mission, .Ministries, 
and other agencies of the government, made a considerable 
contribution to i t. 111'he Government envolved its development 
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programme in the light of the overall recommendations of 
consulting engineers and economists, and specific programmes 
proposed by other consulting engineers and economists, and 
specific programmes proposed by other ~nsulting groups by 
various government agencies,n24 
The United States assisted Burma in the planning 
and execution of major projects (in agriculture, public health 
and medicine, education, housing, industrial research and 
transport) by providing ~20 million (U.S.) aid. Burma had 
received aid valued at approxinately ~~ 900, 000 annually from 
the United Nations. Since 1952, when Burma joined the Columbo 
Plan, she had also received ~>1. 78 million (U.S,) from that 
source. 25 
2. The Aggregate •rargets 
{a) National Income Targets 
'rhe maximum possible increase in total output within 
the eight years was estimated. It was concluded that output 
could be doubled by the end of the decade. The national output 
target was set at Kyat 700 million (i.e., ~vl.4B billion, u.S,) 
by 1959/60 which would be 30 percent above the prewar l evel and 
24 Ministry of National Planning, Economic Survey 
~f Burma, 1221, Rangoon, 1954, p. 57. 
25 ~Iinistry of National Planning, ,~i;conomic Survey 
of Burma, 1.221, RanE;oon, 1958. . 
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78 percent above the 1951 level , 26 To achieve this targe~ 
meant about 8 percent annual increase in the Gross Domestic 
Product. 
'fABLE 3.2 
Gross Domestic Product Goals in 1920-51 Prices,27 
G,D.P, 1938-39 1950-51 1959-60 % increase in 
estimated 1222-60 
on on 
1938-39 1950-51 
Total (m Kyat ) 5,337 3, 710 . 7,000 31 
Per Capita (K) 326 201 3~0 ~ 
C Of!SWner purchases 
(jb to G,D ,P,) 63.3 72.6 66.6 
Note: ;j~l (U.S,) : Kyat 5 (approximately) 
It was estinated that a net capital formation for 
the entire period of K7, 500 million would be required, An 
assumption was n~de that two thirds could be financed 
domestically and one third by borrowing from abroad,28 As 
88 
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there was an improvement in rice export prices at that time, 
the advisors felt that Burma would have no difficulty tn 
financing its investment progran~e. Foreign exchange available 
26 Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett, Preliminary Report gg 
~conomic and Engineering Survey, Rangoon, 1952, p. 172. 
27 K.T.A., Comprehensive Report , Vol, 1, Rangoon, 
1952, Table 11.1, p. 22. 
28 Ibid., Table 111.7, p. 50. 
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for the export of rice would be sufficient to finance the 
whole programme. 
Estimates were also made of the probable division 
of inuestment between the public and private sector, Fifty- · 
four percent of the total investment or K4,020 million was to. 
be invested by government sector for public productive and 
social net capital formation. 29 It was hoped that unplanned 
private investment would make up the remaining, Regarding 
the allocation of total net capital formation, K5,500 million 
or 73 percent would be for productive investment (private and 
public) and K2,000 million or 27 percent would be for investment 
in the social capital,30 
The capital-output ratio! assumed by the Plan 
was less than 2.5:1. Investment expenditure were divided almost 
equally between rehabilitation expenditures which was expected 
to yield a capital-output ratio of 2:1 and development 
expenditure was estimated to yield at a higher capital-output 
ratio of 3: 1. 
3. Sector Programming 
(a) Agriculture 
The Five Year Agriculture Plan resulted from the 
29 Ibid. 
30 Walinsky, op. cit., p, 144, 
r:. 
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Pyidawtha conference in 1952. The programme was concerned 
mainly with the expansion in acreage of paddy cultivation and 
the improvement of methods of cultivation. The goals of the 
plan were to make Burma virtually self-sufficient in food stuffs; 
to increase national income and foreign exchange via exports; 
to provide employment for the rural population; and to 
contribute to higher levels of consumption)! 
In 1955, the Government realized that the Five Year 
Agriculture Plan was inadequate; thus it authorized the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Corporation (A.R.D.C.) to 
form the Land and Agricultural Planning Commission. "It 
provides a comprehensive survey ••• of resources ••• the framework 
for agricultural development ••• specific recommendations ••• 
for an integrated ••• plan both for the short and long run. 
The report is currently (Fall 1956) being reviewed by various 
agencies of the Government!'32 Prices of paddy and milled rice 
were to be fixed by the State Agricultural ~~rketing Board 
( S.A.M.B.); irrigation, flood control and drainage were 
introduced so that farmers could grow t\'lO crops per year; the 
use of more efficient technique of production (mechanization) 
. and fertilizers were suggested.33 
31 Trager, op. cit., p. 40. 
32 ~iinistry of National Planning, Economic Survey 
~£Burma, 122£, Rangoon, 1957, p. 49. 
33 11rager, op. cit., p. hB. 
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In connection with the irrigation programme, the 
K.'r. A. engineers called for four projects, two of which were 
major ones. The programme aimed at increasing the gross 
acreage irrigated by nearly 1. 7 million acres at an estimated 
total cost of K450 million (i.e., -a~94.5 million, United States))4 
(b) F~restry and Mining 
Forestry was not specific~lly emphasized at the 
Pyidawtha Conference in 1952. The K.T.A. Reports stated that 
the forestry situation had been left to an F.A.O. expert and 
the Burmese officials in the Forestry Department for thorough 
study.35 The Forestry Department has followed a strict policy 
of conservation and controlled exploitation, Out of 262,000 
square miles, about 150,000 square miles, of Burma is forest 
area and is government ovmed)6 
The mining consultants recommended the rehabilitation 
of Bawdwin hines of Burma Corporation (chiefly producing lead, 
zinc and silver), the ll'awchi ~·iines (a big tungsten-tin producer); 
and the oil fields of the Burma Oil Company at Chauk. They also 
refommended the development of the Kalewa coal deposits and 
the establishment of a zinc smelter and refinery at ~yingyan. 
'rhe total cost of all these was estimated at Kl5 5 million.37 
34 Walinsky, op. cit., pp. 138-139. 
35 K,T,A., nnal Report, Vol. II, Chapter XXIV. 
36 Burma: The Seventh Anniversary, Rangoon, 1955 , p. 150. 
37 
Walinsky, op, cit., p. 142. 
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(c) Transportation and Communications 
The K.T.A. Plan recommended that K1,765 million be 
spent on transportation and communications between 1954-60, 
with half of it on highways. The highway programme was mainly 
for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the main trunk 
and district roads and the improvements on farm-to-market 
roads. Similarly, the railway programme was mainly for the 
renewal of rails, restoration and improvements of track and 
reparation of major bridges. The ports and waterways programme 
called for the reconstruction of wharves and docks at the port 
of Rangoon. Provision was also made for the purchase of four 
vessels. The air transport programme was concerned chiefly 
with the necessary airport improvements and the eventual 
replacement of the Dc3 domestic fleet. Thus the whole programme 
for transportation and reconstruction. The details are found 
in the table which follows. 
'fABLE 3. 3 
K.T.A. -Planned Expend~ture for Transportation 
and Communication.3 (in million Kyats) 
Highways KB19 
Ports and Waterways 568 
Railroads 273 
Airways 75 
Telecommunications 30 
1,765 
38 Walinsky, op. cit. p. 141. 
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(d) Industry 
The consulting engineers recommended the setting up 
of various plants: a fertilizer factory, bamboo pulp and paper 
mill, a steel products plant, forest products, a sulfuric aUd 
plant, a jute bag and twine mill, cement mill expansion, rice 
br~n oil plant, and an abestos-cement plant. The total of 
Kyats 229 million ($45 million, United States, approximately) 
was planned for investment in those plants. 
The leaders and their advisors were convinced that 
Burma should industrialize in order to diversify the economy 
and reduce the dependence on foreign sources of manufactured 
goods, The K,T.A. consultants believed that "the needs of 
economic development programme demand more efficient private 
organization as well as more efficient public organization. 
The government can assist greatly in developing improved 
efficiency in the sphere of privately organized enterprise.u39 
'Development in the fields of mining and industry, ••• should be 
set up and run on a businesslike basis and that same basis 
should apply to the new autonomous enterprises they (the 
government) set up or sponsor,rr40 
4. Effectiveness of the Plan 
(a) Output and Investment Targets 
The target of nearly 100 percent increase in -~ , ~ - · 
39 K. T .A. Preliminary Report, 2E.!....Qit. p. 222. 
40 K.T.A. Ibid., p. XX. 
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the Gross Domestic Product by 1959-60 (within the eight year 
period) called for approximately an 8 percent increase of Gro::~s 
Domestic Product per annum. This is a remarkable rate for any 
economy as was demonstrated by the actual implementation of the 
plan. The target of K7,000 million Gross Domestic Product by 
1959-60 was not achieved. In fact, Gross Domestic Product in 
real terms in 1959-60 barely surpassed the prewar level and 
fell short of the plan by 19 percent. Besides, the increase 
in population kept it some 15 percent below the prewar level. 
TABLE 3.4 
.§ight Year Plan: National Income Targets and Achievements41 
Gross Domestic Product (1947-48 prices) million Kyats 
Eight Year Plan Actual Achievement 
1950/51 3,431 3,431 
1959/60 7,000 5,513 
Percent Increase 106 61 
Per Capita Production ( l2~Z-~8 prices) Kyats 
1950/51 186 186 
1959/60 340 265 
Percent Increase 81 42 
Per Capita Consumption (124Z-48 prices) Kyats 
1950/51 133 133 
1959/60 244 171 
Percent Increase 83 28 
41 Economic Survey Qf ~ 1221, 1960, Table 11 & IV, 
K.T.A. Comorehensiy~ ~eport, op. cit. 
; . 
., . 
i •, 
I 
! 
: ; 
.: . 
I 
I 
! 
i [ 
I. 
I 
I 
r 
i 
I 
I 
! 
I ' I. 
I I , 
i 
I. 
I 
73 
Actual gross capital formation was 83 percent of that 
envisaged in the original plan. Public capital formation was 
nearly 90 percent and private capital formation nearly 77 per-
cent of the original targets. Net capital formation, private 
and public, was 84 percent of that originally scheduled. 
Table 3,5 indicated that actual investment was quite 
close to that of the targets. However, whether funds were 
invested in appropriate sectors or projects in accordance with 
overall economic well-being, will be considered later. 
TABLE 3.5 
Public and Private Capital Formation,42 Programmed and Actual 1952 - 1959/60 
(Kyats million) 
Original K. T;.A. Actual 
Programme 
Gross Capital Formation 10,672 8,862 
Public 5,225 4,680 
Private 5,450 4,180 
Net Capital Formation 7,500 6' 29'/ 
(b) Sector Programmes 
Actual as % 
of Programmed 
83 
89.6 
76.7 
84 
Targets were accomplished only in a few sectors. 
42 K. T. A. Comprehensive R~port, 'fable 111-7, P· 50, 
~conomic Survey of Bu!f!lli. 19.2..§ .@~ 12QQ. 
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These included: crude oil production, railway passenger traffic 
and the acreage sown to sessamun (a grain). Output of other 
grains fell considerably short ·of expectations. There was 
overestimation of the export of rice as well as other agriculture 
products.43 Although the overestimation of other products 
were less serious, achievement of the paddy acreage and rice 
export targets were crucial to the success of the programme. 
The Plan was very vague so far as expected investment 
by private sector was concerned. Expected investment in the 
public sector was planned and classified sector by sector. 
However, too much emphasis was laid on social overhead expenditure 
(more than half of the total expenditure was allocated to 
highway and communication development). A United Nations 
Economic Advisor to Burma correctly stated that "there seemed 
to be altogether too much emphasis within the programme on 
11ac cessories II like transport, communication and electrification 
(72 percent of the total planned expenditure) and too little 
emphasis on truly productive investment in Agriculture, 
Irrigation, Forestry, Iviining, and I•1anufacturing ( 28 percent). 1144 
Primary productive capital take up only 20.7 percent of the 
total expenditure while secondary productive capital take up 
43 Thet Tun, op cit., Table 10. 
44 E, F, Schumacher, "Some Notes on Burma 1 s Economic 
Development, II A JYiemorandum submitted to Economic &. Social Board, 
Rangoon, February 1953. 
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35.9 percent, and social and administrative capital as much 
as 43.4 percent.45 Walinsky attempted to justify the emphasis 
on social overhead expenditure as being necessary due to wartime 
damage,46 but on balance it would appear that the plan placed 
too much emphasis on social as opposed to productive capital 
outlays. 
There was a lack of discipline and priorities in 
the n~nufacturing industries programme. Similarly, lack of 
discipline and poor coordination hindered the electric power 
programme. The programme adopted did not place sufficient 
emphasis on the primary agricultural, forestry and mining 
sectors. The land nationalization programme was vague and 
ineffective; rice milling improvement left to the private 
sector was adversely affected by lack of effort; recovery 
targets for teak production and exports were not set; the 
Kalewa mining project was clearly not economic; the steel and 
pharmaceutical industry projects lacked adequate economic 
j ustifica t.ion; the acquisition of iiscount aircraft for inter~ 
national air travel was hasty and unwise; the housing programme 
. 
was poorly conceived; the superimposing of the Soviet gift 
projects in the plan was unreasonable.47 
45 Thet 11un op.cit., p. 506. 
' 46 t1alinsky, 02. cit., p. 379. 
47 Vlalinsky, ibid., p. 3?9. I I 
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(c) Other Defects in the Plan 
(i) Overestimation in Administrative Efficiency 
The economic consultants, being from an advanced 
country, took administrative efficiency for granted and 
assumed that there would be sufficient administrative and 
supervisory efficiency in implementing their Plan. They 
adopted Keynesian multiplier theory and expected it to work 
effectively in an underdevelope·d economy like Burma, leading 
them to place too much emphasis on investment. 
There was also the problem of specialized manpower 
(the shortage of administrative, managerial and technical 
experience and skills). However, this deficiency is not so 
serious when compared to the limitations imposed by inefficient 
administration and organization. 
(ii) Assumption on Internal Peace 
Another serious defect in the Plan is the assumption 
that "civil order will be fully established by the beginning 
of 1954 and that peace Nill prevail thereafter,n4B However, 
internal peace was not restored and there was a serious 
reduction in the acreage of rice and other agriculture products. 
Walinsky argues that ~ 1 it cannot be said that poor 
judgment was exercised in adopting this asswnption •••• there 
48 K. '£ .A., Preliminary Report, op. cit·, P· 5. 
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can be little doubt that vigorous action by the government 
could have achieved the result required, and the planners had 
been given reason to expect that the Government would pursue 
such a programme.49 He cited an incident that when one of 
the officials of the Robert Nathan consulting finn questioned 
the validity of security assumption, Prime Minister U Nu had 
said, 11It is true that we cannot know (whether security will be 
effectively established by 1954 or not). But, on the other 
hand, how can we lmow that it will not be so? We will proceed 
on this basis.n50 
(iii) Over Optimistic Forecast of the World Price of Rice 
The main reason for failure of the Eight Year Plan 
lay in the overoptimistic forecast of production and export 
proceeds of rice. Burma is an export surplus economy, and 
rice accounted for over 70 percent of total export. The United 
Nations F.A.O. experts forecasted at that time that prospects 
for the price of rice over the next few years were highly 
favourable. Thus the consultants assumed that the export 
price of rice would not decline below £50 sterling per ton 
by 1959/60 • As Burma's rice production was also assumed to 
49 Walinsky, op. cit., P• 377. 
50 Walinsky, ibid. 
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be increasing they expected the export earnings from rice to 
provide with adequate supplies of foreign exchange. They were 
certain that Burma could finance the K7,500 million of net invest-
ment called by the Plan entirely with her own resources. 
During 1954 and 1955, there was a downward movement in 
the price of rice and Burma underwent an unfavourable experience. 
The price of rice in the world narket declined to £32 by 1957/58. 
Thus just as the implementation of the development programme was 
gaining momentum, foreign exchange earnings fell. The Plan had 
assumed that huge surpluses in the Comprehensive Government 
Budget would result in accumulated foreign exchange reserves. 
But, in practice, the Comprehensive Government Budget in most 
years registered a deficit instead of the planned surplus. As 
foreign expenditure remained high foreign exchange reserves 
fell continuously from Kl,lS5 million in the second half of 
1953 to K516 million in the second half of 1955.51 
11he drop in the price of rice on the world market 
led the government to take rash action. Subsidies which had 
led to an increase in paddy acreage were discontinued. The 
decline in the price of rice imposed a serious blow on the 
Government's confidence in plans, in its ability to carry them 
out effectively, and even in economic development itself. 
5l Ministry of National Planning, Economic .Survey 
of ~~ J121, Rangoon 1958, rrable 31, p. 45 • . 
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TABLE 3.6 
Foreign Bxchange Earnings and Expenditure52 
Year Receipts Payment net of Excess of 
Rice Exports Total Exports non trade Receipts 
Plan Actual Plan Actual 
receipts 
Plan Actual Plan Actual 
1952-53 1,134 993 1,394 l, 267 965 1,019 429 248 
1953-54 1,428 754 1,782 999 1,342 1,435 440 -436 
1954-55 1,445 660 1,765 913 1,505 1,153 260 -240 
1955-56 1,544 889 1,884 1,181 1,624 941 260 --240 
1956-57 1,634 839 2,004 1,152 1,697 1,478 307 -326 
1957-58 1,705 713 2,105 1,018 1,747 986 358 32 
1958-59 1,772 6$0 2,207 980 1,762 925 445 55 
Because the plan took for granted that investment 
could be financed easily through the revenue earned from rice 
exports, government officials paid very little attention to 
the possibility of foreign exchange shortage. They were also 
led to put less emphasis on increasing domestic production in 
sectors like agriculture, timber, and mining, and particularly 
to formulate specific programmes to achieve prewar export levels 
in these basic products. 
As foreign exchange reserves fell, the government 
52 Central Statistics and Economics Department, 
Ministry of National Planning, Rangoon. 
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took drastic measures to improve the foreign exchange situation. 
'rhis included tightening of import control, suspension of 
existing licence, and additional foreign exchange controls. 
However, these measures met with very little success. The 
Government increased the sale of rice by reducing the price 
and by entering into trade agreements (mostly barter) with 
a number of countries.53 Some orders for equipment were 
cancelled while others were deferred, Thus although not 
officially done, the economic framework of the Eight Year 
Plan, for all practical purposes, was abondoned in 1955. 
5. Three Year Implementation Programme 
Having encountered unfavourable experience in the 
long term plans, the consultants turned to a revolving Three 
Year Implementation Programme. Targets for each were to be 
adjusted in the light of the previous year's performance, and 
the financial prospects of the year ahead. This type of 
programming is specially suitable for a country like Burma 
where future conditions are uncertain due to her heavy dependence 
on one primary export commodity. However, it is more of a 
flexible programme; not a comprehensive plan. For example, 
the programme may have an investment target , but an investment 
target has no significance in itself if, as is usually the 
case, its implications on output, income etc. are not calculated, 
53 United Nations, Economic .§!!r_ye~ for Asia W ~he Far~' 1211, E.C.A.F.~., Bangkok, 195 , P· 63. 
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F. THE FOUR YEAR PLAN 
1. Description 
In early 1956, the Ministry of National Planning 
converted the Three Year Implementation Programme into a 
Four Year Plan (beginning 1956-57 and ending 1959-60) for 
various political and technical reasons, The Four Year Plan 
ending 1959-60 would coincide with the life of the New 
Parliament and would thus leave a well-organized state for 
the succeeding government. Its completion date would also 
coincide \~ith the end year of the original Eight Year Plan 
and would permit a comparison of results achieved at the end 
of the decade with the original targets of the Eight Year Plan. 
The fact that Burma needed a comprehensive four year 
plan was agreed upon by not only the Burmese Government but 
also by the consultants from the United States as well. 
However, there was a conflict in the contents of the Four ~ear, 
Plan. 
In June 1957, the foreign economic consultants 
issued the "Blue Book" (as it was known) in which they revised 
the Four Year Plan prepared by the fdnistry of National 
Planning in 1956, The investment targets were raised by 
20 percent for each year. 
At about the same time, the Prime r~Jinister U Nu 
issued directives for the formulation of a new ~·our Year Plan. 
! : 
I. 
I' 
. .. 
82 
Improvements in law and order and internal security were 
emphasized. However, the Prime hinister's directives were 
very general and vague, and were mainly based on his 
speculations as to what should be done to have a more efficient 
administration in the country. 
None of the several versions of the Four Year Plan 
were officially announced, However, since the Plan of Ministry 
of National Planning was used as a framework in the budgeting 
of the capital expenditures of the government, it deserves a 
special study • 
2. Objectives and Targets 
The Four Year Plan was considered a flexible one, 
subject to adjustment in annual budget in the light of 
developing circumstances. 
The objectives proposed in the Four Year Plan were 
to lessen economic instability and to strengthen the base of 
the economy. Economic stability was given preference over 
economic growth. This is a very reasonable objective as the 
Burmese economy was highly unstable after the foreign exchange 
crisis resulting in a sharp decline in the world rice prices. 
Among the targets was one for strengthening the 
country's balance of payments position at the end of the period. 
' ; 
' . 
j ' 
i. 
An increase in foreign exchange was the dominating factor in 
the formulation of the Plan. 
(a) Investment Policy 
As the Four Year Plan inherited a considerable 
number of projects already commenced under the Eight Year 
Plan, the extent for which investment criteria could be used 
was limited. 
\'lith the amount of funds available for new investment 
' 
quick maturing projects were given the first priority because 
of its low capital-output ratio: and short period of gestation. 
There were various reasons for this criteria. In the first 
place because of its quick maturity, the impending problem 
of repayment of foreign loans can be solved in a shorter time. 
Also, the deficit balance of payment problem may be solved 
quickly and stability could be maintained. 
'l1he application of balance of payment criteria led 
to the choice of projects which would earn foreign exchange, 
and projects resulting in import substitution, such as light 
consumer goods, was given preference. 
Under the Four Year Plan, attempts were made to alter 
the previous emphasis on social overhead expenditures. 
Construction expenditures were scaled down considerably. Social 
service expenditures were kept within modest limits in order 
i .j ..
to free more resources for investment in economic production, 
However, expenditure on the maintenance of law and order were 
kept up because of the country's need for .internal security. 
(b) Expenditure Programmes 
The revised Four Year Plan called for a capital 
expenditure of K2,510 million for the four year period 1956-57 
to 1959-60, It was estimated that Kl,3SO million would be 
required in foreign exchange and Kl,l30 in domestic currency. 
The programme envisaged an increase of almost 50 percent in 
the volume of public investment as compared with that of the 
preceding four years. Expenditures on agriculture, mining 
and transport \'lere greatly increased.54 
An estimate was made of financial resources 
calculated on the basis of prospective foreign exchange 
earnings and foreign loans already assured, The plan also 
made provision for large scale imports for private use throughout 
the four year period. It also estimated the foreign exchange 
resources available for capital investment programme by 
deducting consumer imports ,and foreign exchange component of 
public current expenditure from the total foreign exchange earnings, 
After n~king necessary adjustments for imports, 
the plan estimated a deficit of some K420 million foreign 
54 'rransmittal 11Four Year Program, 1956/5.11£. 
'-- Fb 1959/60," lviinistry of National Planning, Rangoon, ,e ruary, 
1957. 
IJ 
I·. 
exchange and about K340 million of domestic currency. However, 
taking the prospective foreign loans into account, they 
believed that the indicated foreign exchange deficit was 
well within the total resources anticipated.55 To be on the 
safe side, Government action was suggested to improve tax 
enforcement, strengthening the tax structure, improving the 
efficiency of the state owned boards and corporations, and 
adjusting the price policy of the state enterprises. Other 
measures were to be used to mobilize resources as well. 
"If the proposed level of capital expenditure is accepted, 
the Government must accept the responsibility for adopting 
the policies and measures necessary to provide the resources 
'I'Tithout further inflation. n56 
(c) Sector Programmes 
Agriculture and irrigation received great emphasis. 
Its share in total investment \vas doubled relative to that 
of the preceding four years. Sown acreage in paddy was 
planned to increase from 10.4 million acres in 1956/ 57 to 
12 million acres in 1959/60; groundnut acreage from 855,000 
to 1.2 million in 1959/60. 
55 .. dd' . l P L :~25 U.S. Loan, A 1t1ona •• 
of K300 million K210 million Soviet Credit, 
Germany Credit,' World Banlc Loam~. 
56 Four Year Plan, op. cit. 
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TABLE 3. 7 
Selected Targets in Agriculture57 
Sown Acreage (000 acres) 1956/57 1959/60 (Targets) 
0 Paddy 10,385 12,000 
-~ 
I~ 
·~ 
'! 
..... 
:1~ 
·:.'· 
" 
Groundnut 
Jute 
Virginia Tobacco 
~reduction (000 tons) 
Paddy 
Groundnut 
Jute 
Virginia Tobacco 
855 
8 
5 
6,362 
195 
8 
1 
1,200 
150 
6 
7,200 
300 
50 
1 
Investment in forestry and mining was larger, although their 
share of total investment was still low due to the lack of 
available projects. In forestry, emphasis was on increasing 
teak production while cutting down the production of non-teak 
logs, 
Targets were set to increase the production of tin, 
1 ead, zinc, coal, building and road ma teria1s, HO\vever , 
production of tungsten and mixed tin and tungsten were not 
expected to increase greatly. 
Table 9, 
Rangoon, 
57 Economic Survey of~' 1221,.Rangoon 1958, 
p. 15; Central Statistics and Econom1cs Department, 
Burma. 
Industry and power retained their share of total 
investment because investment in those sectors was largely 
in continuation of committed projects. 
1,ABLE 3. 8 
Four Year Plan Targets (Selected Products)58 
Forestry Production 1956/57 Output 1959/60 Target 
Teak 178,077 324,000 
Non-teak 704,904 560,000 
Ivdnerals 
Tin ores and concentrates 488 2,100 
'fungsten ores 502 600 
li'l ixed tin and tungsten 1,989 600 
Lead ores and concentrates 27,040 33,600 
Zinc concentrates 15,681 22,000 
Coal 10,800 
Building and Road 11·!a terial s 208,000 521, 000 
3. Zffectiveness of the Plan 
As was mentioned previously, the Four Year Plan was 
not officially adopted. 11he Prime Mnist er firmly believed 
that the Government had made blunders by undertaking a large-
58 ~ srver of~. 1260, Rangoon, ~961 , 
Table 11, p. 21; Table 1 , p. 25 and for targets - c.s.1.D., 
Rangoon. 
; . 
'. 
scale development progra1nme without first re-establishing 
law and order in the country. He confused economic planning 
with administration and implementation by calling for a new 
Four Year Plan emphasizing efficient administration and 
internal security. In his speech,59 he declared that the 
government would henceforth give priority to law and order. 
He also declared that production and export of primary 
agriculture was to be restored and investment in state-owned 
ventures was to be slowed dovm. He suggested the need for 
improvement in efficiency in government boards and corporations 
and as well the expansion of private sector. 
It is clear that the pending Four Year Plan pains-
takingly developed by the ~linistry of i~ational Planning and 
the advisors was practically useless. Increased outlays 
for law and order, fire prevention, etc., would have to be 
financed by additional resources not previously contemplated 
in the Four Year Plan. 'fhus the Prime ~iinister decided to seek 
special attention from the United States Government for the 
law and order programme. 
Although the Four Year Plan prepared by the l11inistry 
of National Planning 1vas not offic ially adopt ed, it served 
59 Premier Reports t2. the People .Q!! ,Law ~d ~, 
National Solidarity, Social i~e~fa~e ; l~ational Economy and 
Forei gn Affairs, Goverrunent Pr1nt1ng Press, Rangoon, 1957. 
I i . 
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as a useful guide in the preparation of the annual capital 
budget. Government expenditure was based on the available 
financial resources calculated in the Plan. However, the 
financial resources re~lized fell short of the Plan estimates 
in the last two years. During the last three years of the 
Plan, the level of planned capital expenditure exceeded the 
budget but the actual expenditures made came closer to 
expenditure planned than to expenditure budgeted. 
1'ABLE 3. 9 
'fargets and Actual Achievements in Agriculture60 
Sown Acreage (000) 
Paddy 
Ground nut 
Jute 
Virginia Tobacco 
Production (000 tons) 
Paddy 
Groundm.it 
Jute 
Virginia tobacco 
Target 
1959/60 
12,000 
1,200 
150 
6 
7,200 
)00 
50 
l 
Actual 
1959/60 
10,667 
1,086 
25 
8 
6,916 
275 
4 
l.J 
60 Economic Surv~ ££ ~ 1262, Ran~?on, ~963 , 
'rRbles 7 and 8; Targets: Central Stati~tics and Economlc 
Department, Iv!inistry of National Plannwg, Rangoon. 
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The targets set in agricultural acreage and output 
were not achieved except in t~e case of Virginia tobacco. 
This is presumably because the irrigation programme was not 
carried out as it appears to have been beyond the executive 
capacities of the responsible departments. 
Targets for timber were not achieved whereas targets 
for non-teak was surpassed. Achievements in the mining sector 
were quite encouraging, except the Ka1ewa Coal project. 
TABLE 3.10 
Achievements in Forestry and i~iining Sectors61 
Timber Production 
1'eak 
Non-teak 
IHnerals 
Tin ores and concentrates 
Tungsten ores and concentrates 
~lixed tin and tungsten 
Lead ores and concentrates 
Coal 
Zinc concentrates 
1959/60 
Target Actual 
324,000 
560,000 
2,100 
600 
600 
33/fJO 
10,800 
22,000 
250,474 
660,842 
1,091 
371 
1,068 
32,184 
18,428 
61 I!:conomic survey 2.£ Burma 1962, 'l'ab1es ll and 18; 
Targets: Central Statistics and Economic Department, Rangoon. 
l . 
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Attempts to scale dom1 expenditures on transport 
and communications were not altogether successful. This was 
on account of heavy commitments and the need to rehabHitate 
transportation facilities destroyed by the insurgents then 
active in the countryside. Some plans for social capital 
facilities --such as the aircraft acquisition programme --
required a more specialized personnel and better management 
arrangements were available. 
From independence in 1948, until 1960, Burma made 
three attempts to develop the country on a planned basis. 
Due to political, technical and economic reasons as discussed 
above, none of the plans met with complete success. Problems 
and defects of planning in Burma as well as that of other 
countries in Southeast Asia will be discussed in the next 
chapter and suggestions for improvements in planning machinery 
will be put forward, 
; 
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CHAPTER IV 
]EASONS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL D.C:VELOPlviENT PLAiiJNING IN THE REGION 
A. THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN PLANNIHG 
The urgent need for planning was emphasized in the 
previous chapters. All the countries in the region realized 
the need and attempted to develop their countries on a planned 
basis since their independence. However, the success of their 
plans has been inhibited by various reasons. Their rate of 
growth of national income was still very low. 
Since the achievement of a certain rate of growth was 
usually the principle objective in most Southeast Asian countries, 
the degree of success in their plans could be partially measured 
by comparing the planned rate of growth with the actual rate 
of growth. 
VJith the probable exception of Burma, none of the 
planned targets could be regarded as ambitious. Their rates of 
population growth were over 2 percent per annum. This would 
call for at least a 5 percent rate of growth in aggregate 
National Income in order to grow as fast as some of the advanced 
countries. i'lith the exception of Indonesia and r.':Etlaya, all 
the Southeast Asian collntries set their targets above 5 percent 
per annum. However, except in the Philippines, the actual rate 
of growth achieved fell short of the planned targets in . 
I 
I 
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all the countries of the region. This was very disappointing 
indeed; but in view of the difficulties and problems they 
faced in the formulation and execution of their plans, the 
progress they made was quite impressive, 
TABLE 4.1 
Southeast Asian Countries: Planned and Actual Rates of Growth1 
Country Period 
Burma p 1952/53-59/60 
p 1956/57-59/60 
A 1950/51-59/60 
Cambodia p 1956/57 
A 1951 - 1959 
Indonesia p 1956 - 1960 
A 1956 - 1959 
lVialaysia p 
A 1956 - 1960 
Philippines P 1956/57-60/61 
p 1959/60-61/62 
A 1951 - 1959 
11hailand 
Population National Per Capita 
Growth Income Income 
Growth 
1.2 7.4 6.2 
l 7.4 5.4 
2.3 5.9 ),6 
2.5 4.0 1.5 
1.7 J,O 1.3 
2.7 2.1 -0.6 
J,1 3.9 0,8 
6,0 
3.1 5.9 2.8 ),2 6.0 2.8 
Note: P - Planned; A - Actual 
1 United Nations, Economic Bulletin ill Asia ~ 
the Far East Vol. XV No . 3, December 1964, New York, 19 4, 
----' ' p. 3. 
i . 
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B. l~ASONS FOR THEIR FAILURE 
The reasons for their inability to achieve the 
targets were many. Factors affecting their plans .which 
were more or less beyond the control of the planners will be 
discussed under "exogenous factors". Apart from these factors, 
there were many other problems both in formulation and 
implementation of plans which caused actual results to 
deviate from the targets. 
l. Exogenous Factors 
~lost of the problems outside those of formulation 
and implementation of plans have already been discussed in 
previous chapters. There are, however, particular factors 
which were directly responsible for the effectiveness of the 
plan. As these factors caused disappointing results in 
planning, they will be given special attention. 
(a) Unfavourable 11rends in Foreign ·rrade 
~~port performance of the countries in the region 
in the decade of 1950-1960 was very unsatisfactory. The 
rate of growth of the volume of exports was 2 percent per 
annum which was much less than the gro\'Ith of exports in other 
parts of the world,2 The basic cause of slow growth in the 
2 Latin American and African countries' rates of 
growth in export was 6 percent per annum. ~·, P• 15. 
I i . 
I . , 
I 
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export sector was the decline in demand for the main primary 
export products of the countries in the region. I~iost countries 
tried to overcome the difficulties by means of export diversification. 
Nevertheless, on the \~hole, no substantial progress in exporting 
took place. i!:ven in the beginning of the present decade, 
primary products still accounted for about 80 percent of the 
total export. On the other hand, the volume of imports expanded 
in the 1950's at the annual rate of 4.3 percent which was more 
than t\dce as high as the volwne of exports) Increase in 
imports was mainly due to increasing needs for capital goods 
in carrying out their development plans. Since the primary 
export sector still remained the strategic determinant of 
import capacities of all the Southeast Asian countries, 
increasing imports could be carried out only through a deficit 
balance of payment. 
'rhe deteriorations in the terms of trade had a 
serious effect on their plans, since all the countries in the 
region were export oriented economies, heavily dependent on 
the export of one or two primary products. Failure of Burma's 
Eight Year Plan due to a fall in the price of rice was already 
discussed. Another most recent example was the experience of 
i•ialaya. In the r.Ialayan Second li'ive Year Plan, gross output 
3 United Nations, E .C. A .F.~., ~conomi£ Bulle~ 
for Asia and li'ar l!;ast Vol. XV, No. 3, New York, 1964, P• 17. ______, 
! • ··· 
' ., 
was expected to grow 4.1 percent annually bringing about an 
annual increase of 0.8 percent in per capita income. Although 
the plan allowed for the decline in the price of rubber, the 
actual decline was faster than expected. 'rhus, even though 
the annual growth of gross domestic product was 4.6 percent 
at constant prices, it stood as low as 1 percent at current 
prices leading to a decline of per capita income of more than 
2 percent annually.4 
The unfavourable balance of trade led to a rapid 
decline in foreign exchange reserves. Successful implementation 
of their investment programmes would necessitate a high 
increase of import of raw materials and capital goods. Due 
to chronically unfavourable terms of trade, most countries 
wel'e faced with foreign exchange shortage which led them to 
cut down their planned investment expenditure. Usually, this 
\'iould result in the inability of fulfilling the investment 
targets, and thus the required rate of growth. ~ven a relatively 
stable economy such as the Philippines had experienced t his 
problem. 5 
4 United Nations, ~.C.A.F.~., ~conomic Bulletin, 
ibid., p. 5. 
5 National Economic Council, ~Five Year ~conomic 
and Social Development Programme, for FY, l S'57-bl, f·iamla , 
January l957,p. 5. 
: I 
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(b} Inefficient Agriculture Sector 
Agriculture's con~ribution to the Gross Domestic 
Product ranged from 34 percent to 5~· percent in the countries 
of the region. From 1950 to 196o, the rate of increase in 
agricultural production declined, 6 'fhe region as a whole, 
which was once a food exporter had become an importer of food, 
This was partly due to a rapid rate of population growth. This 
poor performance in the agriculture sector was one of the 
serious blockages in the countries' attempt to attain the 
target rate of growth. 
Lo\'1 productivity in agriculture was a striking 
feature in Southeast Asia. Problems in agriculture were of 
economic as well as of human nature. Agricultural productivity 
depends mainly upon the techniques used, availability of 
strategic inputs, and size of the farm. Heavy pressures on 
land, unsatisfactory conditions of land tenure, and the 
creation of numerous intermediaries l ed to fragmentation of 
holdings, rack-renting, and chronic agrarian unrest.? This 
resulted in incredibly low l evels of productivity per worker 
~s well as per acre. 
All the countries recognized t he need for 
6 United Nations, Economic Survey of Asi~ and t~e 
Far B:ast, 1963, E .C.A. l~ . j!; ., Banglwk, 1964, p. 122 , fabl e VLI. 
7 United Nations ~conomic Bul let in, Vol. VIII , 
No. 3, November 1957, New Y~rk , 1957 ; P· 2b. 
I 
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industrialization as it was emphasized in their plans. Except 
in the Philippines, most countries had not reached intensive 
development in consumer goods industries until 1960. The 
inefficient agricultural sector had made them difficult to 
industrialize as effectively as they planned, In Southeast 
Asia, the agricultural sector was the key to the functioning 
of the whole economy. Labor for the industrial sector must 
be drawn from the agricultural sector; food production should 
be increased to feed the industrial workers as well as the 
growing population; foreign exchange to finance the import 
of capital goods wus obtainable through the export of primary 
goods. Thus the growth of the whole economy is greatly 
dependent on the agricultural sector. So long as the 
agricultural sector remains inefficient, the growth of the 
whole econG.my will be stagnated. 
tel Insufficient Capital Acquisition 
One problem facing all countries in the region 
\vas capital shortage, Supply of capital depends upon domestic 
savings and foreign savings. \'fays of acquiring adequate savings 
for investment purposes was a crucial and a continuing problem 
to the planners. 
Overspending of the Budget was a very common 
prohlem. ~~or example, in Indonesia 1 s Five Year Plan, almost 
all M.inistries overspent their budget. As the Central Bank 
~ : , 
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had very little control over the money supply (due to lack 
of good monetary markets) the Government deficit was running 
at the rate of 2 billion rupiahs (Le.: ~~40 million, U.S.) 
by the spring of 1957.8 \1ith the supply of money, price level 
and foreign exchange out of their control, the planning process 
in Indonesia encountered great difficulty. It was frequently 
maintained that planning was absurdly irrelevant for the needs 
and possibilities of Indonesia. 
In order to increase investment, the planners 
must make an effort to increase domestic or foreign saving 
or both. In Southeast Asia, except in Nalaya and Indonesia, 
domestic saving has been less than the total investment, 
indicating the heavy dependence on foreign savings.9 Countries 
which have reduced its dependence on foreign exchange had done 
so at the cost of declining investment (e.g. Burma). 
On the other hand, there was a problem in obtaining 
an adequate amount of foreign assistance. Apart from the 
question of debt servicing capacity, some countries were 
unwilling to obligate themselves to other nations by accepting 
financial assistance from them. In addition, due to political 
and economic instability, and inconsistent policies towards 
external investment, the inflow of foreign capital to Southeast 
8 lviason, op. cit., p. 63. 
9 United Nations, J!:conomic Bulletin ill Asie, an_g, 
ihe Far Bast, December 1964, New York, 1964, P• 9. 
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Asia was very limited. In fact, the total amount of foreign 
assistance to Southeast Asian countries has been constant in 
the past few years,lO 
~ven in cases where savings was obtained (either 
from domestic or foreign sources), capital investment has very 
often failed to achieve the expected results. Misuse of funds 
and investment in uneconomic projects have occurred. This wa:·s 
due to the deficiencies in technical capacities and entrepreneurial 
abilities in the Southeast Asian countries. 
(d) Highly Unstable Political Situation 
\~ith the probable exception of 'Ehailand and the 
Philippines, all the countries in Southeast Asia were politically 
unstable since their independence. This situation made it 
difficult for the planners to formulate and implement their 
plans. The experience of Burma was discussed in the last 
chapter. In Indonesia also, one of the main causes of slow 
economic growth was internal instability and insecurity. 
Armed gangs especially in South Sulal'lesi, Atjeh, and \vest ern 
. Java led to a delay in reconstruction of road~, , bridges and 
railroads. Production of agricultural crops in some areas 
were reduced leading to a reduction in exports. 'l'his 
insecurity discouraged foreign investment and reinvestments 
10 M·, P· 22. 
I 
I i . 
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in many areas. Some planta~ions have been abandoned altogether 
because of the security situation. All this was a serious 
obstacle to economic development planning in the sense that 
it drove the resources away from development to defence. 
During 1953, the I'linistry of Defence spent nearly 1 billion 
rupiahs (~20 million , U.S.) more than estim9.ted in the budget, 
it spent three times that of lviinistry of Bconomic Affairs and 
four times as much as the ~iinistry of Education. The f:iinistry 
of Interior spent almost Rp. 500 million (i.e., ~10 million, U. S. ) 
more mainly because of the deterioration of security situation.
11 
In .Laos,, Vietnam and Cambodia, their highly 
unstable political situation had prevented an embarkation on 
the development programme. The Governments had desires for 
planned economic development but as they were more involved 
in maintaining internal security and political stability, they 
had very little time and funds for economic development. In 
most countries in Southeast Asia, the problem of maintaining 
political stability was more severe than the problem of slow 
economic growth. 
2. Problems in Plan Formulation 
(a) Inadequate Statistical Information 
Success or failure of a plan depends ofi the 
11 Higgins, Benjamin, Indonesia's i!:c?n?mic . 
Stabilization and Development, Institute of Pac1f1c Relatlons, 
New York 1957,-p: 109. 
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availability of statistical data. To formulate a plan for 
general rate of development, data on national income, savings, 
investment, export, imports, capital coefficient and population 
over a period of several years are needed, In most countries 
of the region, such information, if available was not accurate and 
. ' 
reliable. To draw a comprehensive development plan for the 
main sectors of a country, additional data such as statistics 
of output, income and employment, price indices and wage 
rates, income and price elasticity of demand and labor productivity 
were needed. Up to date and reliable data on ·these were not 
at all available in countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and 
South Vietnam. Hence they were neither prepared nor well 
equipped to formulate a successful comprehensive plan. In 
Burma, Thailand, Jvialaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, 
relatively adequate statistics could be available for comprehensive 
planning. HO\'Iever, they were of an imperfect character. 
Therefore, large errors in estimation were made in setting 
targets, savings rates, employment rates, investment and national 
income growth. 
Lack of statistics was one of the main obstacles 
facing the planners both in the process of formulation and in 
evaluating actual achi evements. Unsuccessful planning in 
Burma was partly due to inadequat e statisti cs. The Eight 
Year Plan attempted the elaborate system of planning by setting 
targets for nat ional income, per capita income and consumption. 
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Investment and expenditure schedules were drawn, and implicit 
capital-output ratios were calculated. In calculating all 
these, some of the data in 1931, had to be used because the 
last complete census were made in that year and 1953-54 census 
were confined to towns and outlying villages. It \'las unreasonable 
for planners to embark on a comprehensive development with: o.ut-
dated information. 
It was also observed that formulation of the 
Indonesian nve Year Plan \'JO.S delayed partly due to inadequate 
knowledge of Indonesian resource patterns especially those of 
the outer islands. 
(b) Lack of Coordination Bet\'reen the Planning Agencies and 
Other Bodies 
In formulating an effective plan, planning agencies, 
outside experts and community should work together. Usually, 
there were no coordination among the various agencies. 
Formulation of a comprehensive development plan 
for Indonesia took four years partly due to a lack of clearly 
defined relationship of the National Planning Bureau (which 
was responsible for Indonesia 1 s development planning) and 
other government agencies. They met very rarely during the 
first two years. The Hinister of li'inance, 1vho \•las responsible 
for the general direction and formulation of the plan, had a 
wide range of other responsibilities and vtas thus unable to 
.. 
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give continuous attention to matters concerning planning, 
In addition, the authority and responsibilities of the 
officials were not clearly defined, Relationships between 
the Indonesian research staffs and the foreign experts were 
not clearly defined, 'fhis lack of coordination and inefficient 
administrative set up hindered the formulation of plans 
in Indonesia ,12 
Informed observers attributed the failure of the 
Philippines' Five Year Plan to an ineffective Planning process, 
lack of ~oordination among the subsidiaries of the National 
Economic Council and lack of active interest and participation 
of the governmental agencies,l3 
The Four-Year Plan 1956-60 of Burma was not put 
into effect because the decision making authority failed to 
cooperate with the fiiinistry of l~ational planning in formulating 
the plan. Direct and continuous contact with the decision 
making authority is essential. The Prime lliinister must take 
an active part in drawing the plan; not just accepting or 
rejecting the plan after it \'las drawn. 
Cooperation of the private sector was essential 
for effective formulation of the Plan. In its Five Year Plan, 
12 Higgins, op. cit., PP· 4.2-45· 
13 l~iason, .2£.!....£ll.•, PP• 61-62. 
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the Indonesian Government failed to announce policies concerning 
the opportunities for the private sectors both domestic and 
foreign. In other countries as well, the private sector was 
usually ignored in most cases although they expected the 
private sector to fill in the gap bet\veen government expenditure 
and total expenditure required. Their plans did not make 
detailed classifications of act ivities the Goverrunent intended 
to undertake and the fields in which the private sector was 
expected to take up. Thus private and public sectors competed 
for scarce resources leading to wastage, misdirection of 
resources and the creation of bottlenecks. The Planners could 
do very little to improve the situation because there were 
problems of demarcating the specific fields or direction of 
investments for the two sectors. In addition, the planning 
authorities found it difficult to make a realistic forecast 
relating to the private sector. Due to lack of active co-
operation of the privat e sector, t he planners could not easily 
devise appropriate policies in attracting private investment 
to help in the ful filling of private plans and targets. 
Considerations of external assistance in the plan 
vras also essentiJl. Foreign investors were reluctant to 
invest t heir funds in most Southeast Asian countries partly 
because the governments were undec ided in their policies 
tO\~ards foreign i nvE:stors. Very few specific policies for 
foreign investors were expressed in their plans. For instance, 
i 'I 
I' 
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the Indonesian Government was undecided as to what extent 
it wished to rely on foreign investment in achieving its 
development objectives. Without precise policies in such 
matters the successful formulation of an effective development 
plan would not be possible, In addition there were problems 
of coordination between the operations of the .assisting inter-
national agencies and the national development operations 
especially in the working out of the administrative (and 
technical) details of projects chosen for external participation. 
So far as the coordination in the contents of the 
plans were concerned, their parts were usually not well 
integrated. There was still a preoccupation with project and 
sector planning. Very often, their plans consisted merely 
of an enumeration of unrelated segments. However, with the 
improvement in statistics, more and more countries w~re 
moving tO\'lards the stage of aggregate planning which resulted 
in greater coordination among sectors. 
(c) Too Much Stress on Capital Investment 
~ost of their plans laid too much emphasis on the 
importance of capital accumulation. As most planners were 
either foreign experts or foreign trained local experts, the 
importance of human investment, administrative and technical 
efficiency, social and cultural changes were usually under-
estimated. They formulated an ideal plan paying very little 
I ; . 
i ' I 
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i 
107 
attention to the implementation side and predicted the 
expected exact outcome of their plans. Usually such ideal 
plans were not put into practice and if adopted at all, they 
always fell short of the targets. In formulating the plan, 
they seem to forget that they were dealing with people and 
society, not with an exact physical science, Most of them 
were so fascinated by interindustry schemes such as linear 
programming which are suitable only for highly advanced 
countries. Such defects in the for~ulation of plans created 
serious problems in implementation also. A practical plan 
should have administrative, social, technical and financial 
feasibility. 
3. Problems in Plan Implementation 
~a) Lack of Administrative and Technical Staffs 
In both the formulation and implementation of plans, 
adequate number of efficient officials were required. Very 
often, even when qualified planners were available in the 
planning centre, it was not always possible to arrange for 
administrative personnel of requisite training in the field 
of implementation. Failures in coordinating the process of 
plan formulation and implementation were very often responsible 
for failures to achieve planned targets. 
Shortages of managerial, professional and ski l l ed 
personnel both in the private and government sectors were among 
: I 
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the handicaps encountered in the implementations of 
development programmes of the countries in the region, 
Implementation of Indonesia's Five Year Plan v1as delayed 
mainly due to administrative reasons such as delays in 
recruiting shortage of public administration experts, and 
lack of clear cut effective direction,l4 
The Five Year Plan of the Philippines also stressed 
the importance of public administration as a "major responsibility 
in the realization of the goals of economic social development!'l5 
In Burma's Bight Year Plan, the K.T.A. consultants 
made an estimation for additional skilled manpO\'ler requirements 
for the development of both the public and the private sectors.l6 
However, the requirements were so large that it could not be met, 
Various types of specialized manpower such as mechanics, 
agricultural engineers and extension credit workers were needed 
in the agricultural sector. In the industrial field, the need 
for supervisors and technicians was great. Such shortages in 
specialized manpower were met through the hiring of foreign 
specialists. However, this solved only the technical problem. 
As far as the supervision and administrative problems were 
14 Higgins, op. cit., PP• 42-45· 
l5 National Economic Council, ~ ~ ~ar.Economic 
and Social Development Program of the Philippines, Nan1la, 1951, 
p-. 4-o:--- - - - -
16 K,'r.A. Comprehensive Report, Vol. I, 0P• cit., 
Tables VII-2 and VII-3, PP• 96-98. 
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concerned, foreign specialists found it difficult to adjust 
themselves to eastern ways of life and the eastern system of 
work. They usually forced the western system of work to the 
local workers thus creating add itional personnel problems. 
As a result, the manpower deficiencies were more difficult to 
meet on the administrative, supervision and coordination fronts. 
Problems in implementation partly arose from the 
inefficient management of public enterprises. Public utility 
enterprises were important in most of the countries because 
they provided a source of foreign exchange. They were also 
important for the execution of most of the public development 
programmes and for stimulating and assisting private development 
in agriculture, mining and industry. Satisfactory management 
of these enterprises was of tremendous importance in carrying 
out the plans effectively. Performance of most public enter-
prises was very disappointing. Political overloading of staffs, 
government tolerance of feather bedding and lack of discipline 
created disguised unemployment in many c'lterprises.
17 These 
problems arose due to lack of experience in the choice of 
executive officers of various enterprises, failure to delegate 
internal authority and operational responsibility. From the 
president of the enterprise to the office clerk, display of 
initiative and self-reliance was lacking. host of them were 
17 . \ } 9r.: Halinsky, op. cit., pp . lr88- + /• 
' ' I 
i . 
! ' I 
no 
appointed for political reasons and were thus uninterested 
or lethargic in their work. Due to very little incentive to 
exercise initiative and severe punishments for mistakes, the 
operations of most public enterprises were slow. 
Coordination among government agencies was very 
poor. It was found that in 1955 the lagging timber exports 
of Burma were not due to declining production and sales but 
"to the inability of the State Timber Board to arr&.nge with 
the Union of Burma Shipping Board to carry timber on Government 
owned vessels. nlB 
The Ministers had little appreciation of the 
problems involved in public enterprise operation. No efforts 
were made to imr.rove the skills and policies required to manage 
them effectively. 'rhe staffing of the board of directors of 
these enterprises was entirely without relation to the ability 
and experience needed. 
(b) Financial problems 
Ineffective mobilization of domestic savings was 
one of the serious handicaps in the implementation of a 
development plan. In Southeast Asia, the governments did not 
practice enough fiscal policies to raise domestic savings which 
18 Walinsky. DE· cit., P• 455 • 
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were needed to bridge the gap between total planned investment 
and the available domestic savings, Foreign exchange earnings 
were usually not forthcoming as the planners had anticipated. 
For example, implementation of Burma's Eight Year 
Plan came to an abrupt stop due to a shortage of foreign 
exchange \~hen the price of rice in the world market fell sharply, 
Thus, during 1954-55, the capital progra~ne was cut back sharply 
from its initial level of K9$0 million to roughly K500 million. 
The Government was so involved in correcting their foreign 
exchange deficit that the deficiency in domestic finance was 
greater after 1955 than before 1955. The Governments with 
their conservative financial policies was unwilling to impose 
a heavier tax load on the masses of people in agriculture. 
They refused to face the fact that substantial increases in 
tax revenue could not be achieved in any other way. The 
Government, i'rl.thout reluctance, increased duties on luxury 
goods, liquor and tobacco. Nevertheless, they were unwilling 
to tax in ways that might pinch a substantial number of voters 
or to reduce or el iminate costly subsidies or favours which 
insured continued political support for their party. Such 
political consideration made them l ack t he determination t o 
make necessary efforts to increase revenues. 
In most of their plans , foreign assistance played 
a very large role .l9 However , most of the foreign assistance 
I\ 
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Burma . 
example, for ei gn aid account ed for mor e than ' i 
capital expendit ure in the Four Year Plan of ' , ,, ,~  i 
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available to Southeast Asian countries were in the nature of 
loans which they were committed to pay back at a future date 
with interest. IViost of the foreign aid was military aid to 
Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam from the United States. Foreign 
aid was not forthcoming probably because foreign policies of 
most Southeast Asian countries were vague, Due to many 
political reasons the guvernments were reluctant to commit 
themselves by accepting aid from advanced countries. 1'his 
has been apparent especially in Burma and Indonesia. Most of 
the countries in the region thus ended up by taking a variety of 
foreign loans to solve their financial problems which usually 
led them to overborrowing. 
(c) Promoting Private Action 
lviost of the development programllles in the region 
put great reliance on the private sector. Unfortunately, in 
actual implementation of their plans, private investment was 
not forthcoming as anticipated. Indirect means of implementation 
through monetary and credit policy was not at all effective in 
Southeast Asia. This was mainly due to underdeveloped money 
and capital markets, The banking habit was not fully developed; 
people had more preference to cash than banlc deposits. 
Bank ro.te policy had limited effectiveness. ~,or 
example 
1 
in early 1954, the Central Bank of the Philippines 
reduced its discount rate from two to one and one-half percent 
I ~-
' . ' 
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to stimulate private economic activities. However, interest 
rates of the commercial banks went up instead · of down. 20 Open 
market operations were not successful. Its success depends 
greatly on the existence of a sizable amount of P'Overnment 0 
securities and upon their marketability. Government securities 
of most of these countries were not very attractive because of 
their low rate of interest and earnings. Generally corporate 
securities of sound credit yields varied from $ to 12 percent 
per annum as compared to 4 to 5 percent on government securities.21 
Lowering of reserve requirements was not effective, as most 
commercial banks held reserves much higher than that required 
by the Central Bank. Selective credit control was not widely 
used except in the Philippines where the Central Bank had 
initiated a policy of discouraging residential building and 
construction, and encouraging credit for agriculture and 
industrial production. Thus in Southeast Asia, private action 
could not be promoted through monetary and credit policy. 
The only way of promoting private action apart 
from direct government intervention was through fiscal policies 
and taxation. Present policies do not create enough incentive 
20 The Central Bank of Philippines Annual Report 
-- ----1954, ~ianila, 1954. 
21 United Nations Economic Bulletin fQr Asia ~ 
the li'ar :&l.st Vol. VII, No. 3,1~ovember 1956, New York, 1957, 
_____ , 
p. 42. 
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for sufficient mobilization of private investment. Taxation 
policies as discussed earlier were based on political and 
cultural rather than economic considerations. Such deficiencies 
in fiscal policies and the inability of monetary policies to 
promote sufficient action made implementation of economic 
development programmes extremely difficult. 
All the problems discussed above are major general 
problems which had direct influence on the formulation and 
execution of planning in Southeast Asia as a whole. There 
are other important problems, specific in nature, and are 
peculiar to an individual country. Dealing with such problems 
would involve a wide and detailed research work on each 
individual country in Southeast Asia. As this would go beyond 
the objective of this thesis, they will not be considered here. 
t.General suggestions and recommendations to overcome the 
problems discussed will be brought forward in the next chapter. 
! . 
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CHAPrl'ER V 
SUGGES'riO NS Ai~D l:lliCOivJ\£l~DA'riO NS 
A. FOlli,iULA'rE A PRAC'l'ICAL PLAN 
Nost governments associated economic development 
with plans strictly for investment and capital accumulation. 
Their plans were too idealistic and impractical considering 
the existing natural, human and financial resources. 'fhe 
success or failure of a plan mainly depended upon the choice 
of a suitable period for planning, the size of the agencies 
responsible for planning and their techniques of planning. 
Judging by the experience of Southeast Asia, the following 
suggestions might be useful in solving the problems in plan 
formulation. 
l. Choose Correct Period for PlanninE 
Nost of the countries in the region plunged into 
comprehensive economic planning immediately after independence 
where political, economic, and social conditions were very 
unsettled. Due to changes in governments, management and 
administration of most departments were disorganised. During 
such periods of transition when there were political, administrative 
and economic instability, the governments should be contented 
with project planning, and reconstruction. Comprehensive planning 
should be adopted only when sufficient stability was maintained. 
. i 
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2. Availability of Requisite Data 
Availability of statistical data was very limited. 
Attempting to draw a comprehensive development plan without 
even knowing the country's potentials would be like walking 
in the dark. Therefore, broad strategies of development 
appropriate to the countries concerned should be first realized 
by carrying out qualitative explorations such as sw·veys of 
basic problems, characteristics and conditions of the country. 
These surveys could be made \~ithout much f inancial difficulty 
by a qualified specialist who is well acquainted with the 
country concerned. In addition, quantative surveys on natural, 
human and financial resources; geological and soil surveys; and 
surveys of market for goods and service industries potentials 
must be made. 
Formulating a plan \'lith inaccurate data could be 
very dangerous. 1'herefore, in order to check on production, 
employment and balance of payments statistics, every country 
J should ~ve a s~ll research sect ion in its central statistics 
~; a gene ie s , This research section should be given the r esponsi b i li ty 
,. 
I.' ! to keep up to date figures on population and labor force, 
[ r national incomes, savings and investment dat a. 
1:: 
{.~ ~ The shortage of trained personnel l imited 
~ ·, i' i mproven1ents in the quality of data availabl e. 'J'hus the 
'·· 
l · f · t e national agrencies 
r governments should seek ass1stance r om 1n -r · 
1.: 
' I ,. 
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for the provision of professional and technical personnel for 
necessary surveys. The Uniti2d i•iations experts recommended that 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East should play 
a useful role by making the services of experts av-ailable to 
these countries. 1 ·If extensive surveys \•/ere not possible due 
to lack of funds, sample surveys could be very useful. They 
would give planners the idea of the nature of the problems 
they faced and thus guide them to solutions. 
Although reliable statistics are essential, the 
country's development cannot wait for the building up of 
statistical information. The flm.,r of statistics should be 
expected to improve as a country develops. Planners should 
go on \dth their planning activities on project planning 
and aggregate planning to a certain extent \dth the existing 
statistical data and simultaneously improve its statistical 
information. 
3. Planning Agencies 
host countries called in outsiders such as forei;n 
experts or local specialists in assisting or prefarin~ for a 
development plan. Hov1ever, a permanent org,;,nization 
responsible for planning would. be essential because economic 
l United Hations, Z.C. A . F . i~ , ~conomi~ Sulletin 
for Asia and the Far East , December 19olr, Vol. J3, !w. 3, 
b e~·1 'Y'Ork, 1964, p-:83 :--
I 
; . 
.. 
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planning should be a continuous process. A planning organization 
must exist at the very outset of the planning process so that 
its staff may increase in experience and capability as time goes 
on. Therefore, a separate entity usually called the Planning 
I<inistry should be created for the actual preparation and 
formulation of the plan. This hinistry should not be under 
any l1iinistry; its responsibility should be to ensure efficient 
planning in all ssctors of the economy. 
In all the countries in Southeast Asia, planning 
authority was usually entrusted to a board or a council headed 
by the Prime Hinister with Cabinet I\'iinisters as members. However, 
members of the Planning Council should be concerned only 
i\'ith economic planning and serve only as an advisory board 
to the Ministry of Planning. The planning staffs should be 
attached to the [f;inistry and not to the Council. Technical 
aspects of plan formulation are to be left totally to the 
qualified experts in the l1iinistry, Thus foreign advisors and 
consultants should work under the Ministry and have no direct 
relationship 1vith the Planning Council. The Council should 
have a final decision making authority and be responsible for 
the making of suitable recommendations to guide the hinistry 
towards effective planning. Therefore, to have the Council 
~iembers well informed, top ranking civil servants such as the 
chairman of the Central Bank and economic and technical advisors 
from the Planning l~iinistry must be invited to sit in on the 
meetings. 
r . 
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It would be impossible for the Planning Ministry 
to take full responsibility for effective planning. Various 
Government agencies and departments must also contribute 
significantiy to the planning process. Therefore, drafts of 
plans for specific sectors such as agriculture, mining, 
industry, transport and education should be prepared by the 
respective l~"linistries and Departments, The staffs of the 
Planning Ministry are to review, appraise and coordinate the 
several sector plans in terms of consistency, their relation 
to one another, financial, administrative and technical 
feasibility and finally their relationship to the major 
goals. This process of review, appraisal and coordination 
should be carried out in close cooperation with various 
departments so as to strengthen the plan and to establish a 
smooth working relationship. 
4. Qualified Planning Staff 
One criterion for an effective plan is the need 
for an efficient .planning staff. The planning staffs should 
know precisely what t'i'aS required of them; they must be able 
to do the following:- form consistent targets and have an 
understanding of the responses of private and business sectors; 
b e well inf armed a bout their country 1 s e c anomie and tee hnol ogical 
problems in development; derive meaning from scanty data 
available· and have knowledge of the local conditions combined 
) 
with good economic judgment. rrherefore' provisions for 
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appropriate training of at least the high level officials 
in planning organization would be necessary in order to make 
them more efficient participants in planning team work. It 
should be noted that the task of planning required not only 
economists and statisticians, ·but also engineers and scientists 
as well as administrators. Administrators could be drawn to 
a certain extent from different government departments and 
technicians from private ent8rprises. 
5. Improve Relations With the Public 
Usually the planning agencies did not have adequate 
links with the rest of the conununity. A sound plan depends 
greatly upon the information obtainable and the opinion of 
select people from the general public. The planning body 
should have close contact with outside opinion through bodies 
such as universities, busines3 associations, trade unions, etc. 
so that such bodies could contribute to the flow of information, 
and their opinions vital for the plan. The planning body must 
have a flow of current data relating to events and opinions in 
different segments of the economy and thus be able to judge 
the responses of fa rmers, businessmen, workers, and other groups 
of different policy measures. 
~·lost countries in the region placed heavy reliance 
on the private sector. At this stage , without full and active 
cooperation of the private sector, successful planning would 
be impossibl e. 
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6. Target Setting 
Plans in Southeast Asia had failed to achieve 
their targets mainly because some of their targets were too 
idealistic and impractical and because they were set by 'the 
rule of thumb 1 , \'lith out sufficient considerations of the 
conditions in the country. Targets must .be consistent with 
the objectives. Aggregate and other targets should be derived 
from the objectives. The choice of planned objectives of a 
country depends mainly upon the basic characteristics of the 
economy, economic and social problems confronting the country, 
the stage of economic planning, political consideration and 
also on the availability of statistics. 
Characteristics of most Southeast Asian countries 
were such that low per capita income, low standard of living, 
and poor social overhead facilities persisted. Therefore 
targets for increasing the per capita consumption and per capita 
income should be emphasized. Investment targets should be 
concentrated mainly on improving the infrastructure in select 
fields. In countries which had severe population pressure such 
as Indonesia and the Philippines, high level of unemployment 
usually prevailed. Therefore, certain employment targets should 
be set. The transfer of population from agriculture to industry 
might also serve as an objective. 
It is important that investment targets be related 
' . 
' .. 
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and consistent with income targets; otherwj.S.e, over-investment 
could result. Such over-investments could lead to inflation 
' 
shortage of capital and balance of payments difficulties. 
~ Conswnption targets could not be fixed independently of income 
J and investment targets. Employment targets should be derived ~'i 
._-: 
~ . 
' 
: I. _, 
I; ! i ; ~j I:~ 1' .. 
from income and investment targets. Thus, it is important 
that aggregate targets be well coordinated. Coordination of 
such targets could be sought through National Income Accounts, 
capital-output ratios, the saving-income coefficient, and 
export-import coefficients. 
Targets must be set in the light of funds likely 
to be obtained to finance the plan. As the camnon problem in 
Southeast Asia was shortage of capital, setting of targets 
without determining the available sources of funds and without 
analysing the reliability of such sources would be irrational. 
Without reliable financial backing no plan would be operative. 
'fe.rgets and objectives set would then be a mere expression of 
desires of the planners. 
In setting the sector targets, it would be appropriate 
to set tar~ets for the production and conswnption of final 
goods and services. Calculations for the requirements and 
supply of intermediate and capital goods as well as transport 
and energy services for the production of such goods should 
be made. After estimating the sectoral production targets, 
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final output targets were to be revised. The planners should 
determine the various projects to fulfill these targets. Total 
investment requirement could be obtained by the summing up of 
investment requirements for all the projects. Aggregate targets 
and sector targets should be adjusted until they were mutually 
consistent with each other. 
·rhe time dimension of the target would vary with 
the duration of the plan. Ho'l'tever, interim targets within the 
plan period could be desirable. Targets should be revised 
annually so that they would be consistent with the changing 
economic and political conditions of the country. Very often, 
they tend to be a mere projection; targets of such nature 
should be avoided. 
A capital budget which shows the requirement of 
capital and the sources of domestic and foreign capital must 
be included in the development programming. In addition, 
effective foreign exchange budgeting was essential in all 
Southeast Asian countries. iv[ost countries have a foreign 
exchange problem and balance of payments difficulty. 1
1
herefore 
it was important to make the best possible use of availabl e 
foreign exchange resources and correct assessment of the likely 
f uture availability of such resources. 
i or effective foreign exchange budgeting, a forecast 
! : 
' !' 
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of the future supply of foreign exchange should be projected 
by forecasting the markets for export industries. Uncertainty 
of demand and wide narket fluctuations should be taken into 
account in making such forecasts. In addition, foreign exchange 
requirements for 'normal' purposes as well as special developmental 
purposes should be calculated. This could be done by estimating 
direct import requirements of various investment projects in 
the development programme, and estimating further import 
requirements after taking import substitution into accoun'li. 
Finally, the development programme should be adjusted so as 
to balanc~ the foreign exchange budget. This would mean 
~; directing foreign exchange resources into their most essential 
··. 
;,:, 
use. For countries like Burma and Indonesia, where the balance 
of payments deficit was very severe, keeping a balanced foreign 
exchange budget should be one of the aims of the plan. 
7. Priorities 
In formulating a development plan, the planner 
must decide which sectors should be given greater priority. 
Generalizations could be made to a certain extent so far as 
the countries in Southeast Asia were concerned. An effective 
development plan for any of those countries should give special 
attention to improvement of the agricultural sector, for 
development of infrastructure,aud industrializat.ion, especially 
in import substitution industries. 
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(a) Agricultural Sector 
Governments should pay particular attention to 
the improvement in agriculture because productivity in the 
agricultural sector was very low. Since their independence, 
the necessity to improve the agricultural sector was expressed 
in all their development plans. 2 However, their policies 
centered mainly around national extension service, conununity 
development schemes, and even on the acceleration of cooperative 
and collective farming. In all their agricultural development 
plans, measures for land reformation were emphasized. Neverthe-
less, they had paid very little attention to increase in 
productivity through improvements in the system of farming, 
in the techniques of production and through improved utilization 
of land and water resources • 
Planners and policy makers must determine the right 
:Size of farms to be distributed to the farmers to have a better 
man-land ratio. Very often bottlenecks occurred due to a 
shortage of strategic materials for agriculture. Therefore, 
to have adequate supplies of agricultural inputs, calculations 
of the amount of fertilizers, insecticides, seeds and other 
small items of capital equipment, must be made before hand, 
If such materials were not available domestically, imports of 
2 United Nations, t:,C,A.~'.t.., l!:con~mic Bullet~n 
for Asia and the Far l.!:ast, Vol. VIII, No. 3, November, 1 ~ 57, 
New Y'Ork, 1957,p:2e:-
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adequate quant'ities of such items must be given priority • 
As problems in production have occurred due to the shortage 
of water in the dry seasons, the planners should pay close 
attention to necessary irrigation schemes, 'rhe practice of 
multiple croping should be encouraged so that the farmers 
diversify production and are also able to increase the 
productivity of land, 
Heavy capital investments in agriculture could not 
be made in Southeast Asia due to shortage of capital. Therefore 
instead of adopting highly capital intensive techniques such 
as mechanized farming, labor intensive t echniques should be 
used. It would be appropriate to adopt the Jap3.nese technique 
of rice cultivation where productivity could be raised vvith 
very little capital investment. 
The planners should bear in mind the severe limitations 
in agricultural expansion caused by the unfavourable relationship 
between the farmers and the distributors. Appropriate policies 
for selling and distribution should be made. If the relati onship 
could not be improved with policies and r egul ations , the 
government should take over the responsibility of distributing 
the main agriculture products. 
·ro reduce dependence on one or a .few predominating 
export crops, plans for diversification of agricultural crops 
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should be emphasized, Practice of multiple cropping could 
be encouraged and incentives be given to farmers to grow 
agriculture products other than what they normally grow. 
It is important that realistic targets of production 
be set in agriculture. 'rhere must be sufficient information 
available on the response of various crops in different regions 
so as to improve practices such as irrigation and application 
of fertilizers. Reliable methods of collecting current 
statistics on the sown area and production of various crops 
should be worked out before setting the targets, If such 
infonnation is not available, targets of production might 
reflect hopes and desires rather: than realistic possibilities. 
(b) Infrastructure Development 
Adequate infrastructure development was essential 
for a rapid growth in agriculture as well as for the building 
uu of foundations for industrialization. The go"Verrunents of 
• 
Southeast Asian countries had allocated a high percentage of 
their expenditure to social overhead facilities, but most of 
its expenditures in this field were misallocated. Prestige 
expenditurf:s on lavish airports, building of model towns, 
introduction of television were made mainly for window dressing 
and political purposes. Ill advice of consultants had led 
them to invest in the development of hydroelectric power from 
unoconomic sources and the training of physicists, chemists 
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and economists (in advanced countries) whose services were 
not yet needed in the region. 'rhus although large expenditures 
were made for social overhead facilities, they did very little 
to help the infrastructure development. 
Priority should be given to the programme of mass 
education as investment for the improvement of basic education 
is absolutely necessary. Improved and effective education at 
the primary, secondary and technical levels would increase the 
people's will to develop, as \'tell as improve their organizational 
capacity. The experience of Japan during the heiji period 
should be noted here. V~1en the percentage rate of school 
attendance increased from 28 percent in 1823 to 98 percent in 
1910, the extent of Japanese willingness to work and their 
ability to mam;;e had increased. The proportion of salaries 
paid to the foreigners fell from 58 percent in 1868-72 to 
23 percent in 1883-87.3 At the present stage, less emphasis 
should be civen to expensive training of advanced scientists, 
engineers and lawyers. 
Communication systems can be improved by improving 
the roads, raihmys and port services for select areas . The 
planners should choose a number of to\vns and villages which 
3 Koichi Emi , "The Growth o~ Japanes~ Econo~y in 
the F'irst Half of the heij i Period, 11 Ihtosubashl Journal of 
Economic~ June 1963, P· $. 
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\l have potential for development. Choice of su.ch areas must 
·.'.-·1 
··' ~· I 
be made on an economic rather than on a political or historical 
basis. I~lodest improvements on the communication network should 
be made in and around the areas choseg,. High quality paved 
roads all over the country, lavish port facilities and unnecessary 
purchases of railway carriages and aeroplanes should be avoided. 
Expenditures on the improvements of the drainage 
system, the building of dams and appropriate irrigation are 
very essential for most countries in Southeast Asia. Such 
expenditures could have a direct effect on the productivity of 
farmers and thus the productivity of agricultural production 
which the countries placed great reliance on. 
(c) Industrialization 
Industrialization could be achieved together with 
the increased productivity in agriculture. Although statistics 
in most countries indicated that rapid industrialization had 
been made, there was a great deal of misinvestment in the 
industrial sector. Setting up steel mills without having 
enough iron scrap or iron ore to work on, purchasing unsuitable 
machineries and building factories in 'III'Ong locations occurred. 
, 
Thus before planning to invest in an industrial project, 
analysis must be made with l'egard to availability of raw 
mat8rials suitable machinery and choice of suitable location. 
, 
! . 
=·i 
·'· 
; · 
130 
For the import substitution purposes, rapid 
industrialization should be made in consumer goods industries. 
At the present stage, the countries should be more practical 
by continuing their reliance on the industrialized nations as 
the suppliers of capital goods. Top priority should be given 
to industries which are not very capital intensive and those 
industries for which raw materials \vould be domestically available. 
In other words, primary industries and consumer goods industries 
should be encouraged and highly capital intensive industries 
should be ignored for the time being. 
A mere announcement of the plan could not be regarded 
as an adoption of the plan if th0 policies and measures were not 
put into operation. Decisions must be made as to what type 
of functions the government should presume and ,,1hat should be 
left to the private sector in the process of attaining t he 
announced goals. Administrat i ve, t echnical and organizational 
efficiency must be reassured. Alternative plans should be 
prepared just in case the present plan could not be implemented 
due to factors which were beyond the country's control. Lastly, 
periodical evaluation of actual achievements should be made . 
1. Stiumlate Private Action 
The governments should decide from the outset, how 
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much of the planned investment should be left to a private 
enterprise. To promote domestic as well as foreign investment 
in the private sector, the policy makers must state clearly on 
what terms and in which projects private investment would be 
welcomed. Doubts concerning profit distribution, price controls, 
taxation and nationalization policies should be cleared. In 
case of private foreign investment, definite announcement of 
partnership and employment regulations, transfer of capital 
and profits, procedures of nationalization and above all 
' 
industries which do not welcome foreign capital, "muld be 
essential. 
'£here were difficulties in drawing an exact line 
of demarcation between sectors for public investment and those 
for private investment. It would be best, however , that the 
social overhead capital such as means of transportation and 
communication, education and health facilities be undertaken 
by the government. The former should also be responsible for 
investment in primary industries and other 'key' industries 
which are essential to the countries but are beyond the capability 
of the private investors. flianufacturing industries and some 
service industries should be left t o the private sect or as 
they could be operat ed more efficiently on a profit making basis. 
However even such industries should not be left totally to 
' the private sector. The governments should indi rectly channel 
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the resources into required sectors through effective fiscal 
policies and other measures. 
Private investment could be indirectly encouraged 
by opening opportunities for the private investors through 
publication of findings in market surveys, building industrial 
sectors, development corporations and development banks, and 
financing technical training. A substantial investment in 
the maintenance of law and order in improved public services 
would also stimulate private investment. 
It was extremely important that the private funds 
were invested in the right sectors. Appropriate monetary and 
fiscal policies should be applied in order to direct or induce 
private funds into a desirable field. The governments could 
direct private enterprise by import and exchange control 
measures such as licence quota and authorization, which can 
make it illegal or unprofitable for private enterprise to do 
a number of otherwise profi table ventures. The governments 
could mobilize private investors by means of appropriate 
taxation policies and subsidies in such a way that private 
enterprises found it most profitable to conform with the wishes 
of the government. 
~lost traditional monetary policies were inoperative 
in Southeast Asia. However, selective credit control policies 
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~ could be effective if they are well applied. 'fhus a more 
' i; stringent control over the c cxnmercial bank lending policy 
would be necessary in order to direct savings from unproductive 
purposes to investments loans for productive industrial enter-
prises under the national development programme. 
2. Organizational, Administrative, and 'l'echnical Efficiency 
for Effective Plan Execution 
To carry out a plan effectively, responsibility 
for the execution of each project or each sector programme 
should be assigned to the most appropriate agency for that 
purpose. For example, the execution of agricultural prog:cammes 
should be assigned to the l·iinistry of Agriculture, the execution 
of power projects to the ~linistry of Industry and so on. If, 
for instance, the Mnistry of Agriculture was not capable of 
assuming full responsibility of implementing the agriculture 
plan, a new organization such as Rural Development Corporation 
should be created to execute the plan effectively. 
o::.:.' 
The pla~ners must make sure that the leadership, 
s t&ff and the conditions of the organization that assume the 
responsibility are qualified and efficient. Appointments and 
promotions in accordance with seniodty, political reliabilities 
and political obligations should be CJ.voided. Appointments of 
staffs should be made open to persons who have the necessary 
qualifications, intec;rity, and enthusiasm in their \vork. If 
: ·. I 
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necessary, already appointed staffs should be retrained in 
the technical and administrative field so that they could 
Nork in harmony with the policies of the plan. 
l!:ffecti ve performance 'I'JOuld not be possible without 
clearly delegated authority and responsibility. Administrative 
procedures and set up must be arranged in such a manner tha.t 
~.·.·. employees must be able to function to their best. Budgeted 
~ funds should be available on schedule to make fast action 
.;: possibllil. Periodical evaluation of actual achievements 'l'lOuld 
t : ~ · be necessary. Thus an evaluation organization as a branch of 
the f~inistry of Planning is urgently needed. This evaluatory 
must be in close contact with the respective departments 
responsible for implementation so as to make effective coordination 
and supervision. 
3. Prepare Alternative Plans 
'fhere might be some sudden drastic changes in the 
economic and political conditions (external or internal) 'ilhich 
would require major changes in the actual execution of the 
plans. Thus it would be best that plannin~ agencies have 
alternative plans ready to meet the likely changes in conditions 
and policies, 'fhe planning staff should know exactly what is 
required to them, that is what form of alternatives of development 
policies they have to prepare. In preparing alternatives , 
! . 
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reference must be made to different levels of resources 
required, different possibilities of external and internal 
f,· resources available and varying distributions of development 
( expenditures. The preparing of prograrrunes should be limited to 
,, 
.. 
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what was really necessary and be strictly \·lithin the range of 
practical possibility. 
Plan formulation and plan implementation are very 
much related. If the plan formulated is not realistic, 
feasible implementation cannot be possible. A clear line of 
demarcation cannot be dra\m as to what should be done for 
effective plan formulation and what steps are necessary for 
successful implementation. Some su~ge stions and recommendations 
are necessary basic steps to be taken for the countries 
concern, but they would by no means be suff icient. l!:very 
country will havt: problems of their own in vlhich generalization 
cannot be made. Dealing r1ith such problems involve a detail 
study of each country in Southeast Asia v1hich is beyond the 
scope of this t hesis. 
I 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMriiARY AND CO i~CLU SIOi~ S 
The basic problems of the countries in Southeast 
Asia are cultural, economic and political in nature. The 
most important appear to be low income, shortage of skilled 
personnel, inefficient agricultural sectors and political 
instability. rhese fo.ctors were mainly responsible for the 
slow rate of economic growth actually achieved before planning 
I·: began. 'l'he goverrunents were aware of the problems. They were 
I: also a~.are of the widening gap between their countries and 
advancr~d countries. Thus, the governments concluded that a 
1 .. ' ' i ' J 1 
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short cut method of development was essential, that is, central 
economic planning. Awareness of defects in market mechanism 
had been increasing. The rapid economic development in 
Corrununist China and the Soviet Union through central planning 
v,ras not unnoticed by the governments in Southeast Asia. Hence, 
although the degree of government intervention diffe red from 
country to country, the role of economic planning has increased 
rapidly since the Second World iiar. 
'rhe experience of economic planning in Burma ....as 
studied in this thesis in sorne detail as she \vas one of the 
first nations in Southeast Asia to attempt comprehensive 
planning in a formal manner • ller approach to planning . 
1 ', 
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has been analysed. On the whole, it was found that Burma 
at that time WHS not yet ready for comprehensive planning: 
the main reasons being the absence of internal peace, lack 
of diversification in exports, and administrative and technical 
deficiencies. As most Southeast Asian countries have similar 
cultural and economic characteristics, the consequence of 
comprehensive planning in Burma is widely applicable to other 
countries. 
By comparing the planned rates of growth and the 
actual rates of growth of most countries, it is found that 
economic planning had not been successful in South~ast Asia. 
However, these failures did not prove that achieving economic 
growth on a planned basis is unsuitable for Southeast Asian 
countries. Failure of the plans \'/aS mainly due to the unstable 
political situation, unfavourable terms of trade, and inefficient 
agriculture sectors. In add.ition, the 6overnments were 
constantly faced with problems of inadequate statistical data, 
shortage of administrators and technicians, and other organ-
izational problems. Such defects, combined with a lack of 
sufficient cooperation by the private sector and the shortage 
of actual available fundll for investment made the plans 
d ifficnl t to execute. There are other problems which are 
peculiar to individual countries 1 but t hese are not c onsi de red 
in this thesis. 
; . I 
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I;;ost of the problems faced in Southeast Asia were 
of structural in nature. The private sector was not strong 
enough or active enough to overcome the problems all by itself. 
The urgent need for government intervention and planning was 
obvious. Ho\.,rever, the objectives of t he plans should not have 
been centered around such factors as high rates of capital 
accumulation, and rapid industrialization. Simpler plans would 
have been advisable. ~mphasis should have been placed first 
of all on obtaining all the necessary statistics and other data. 
l1!ore appropriate objectives would have been concerned with the 
improvement in agricultural sector, promoting infrastructure 
development, and the development of import substituting consumer 
goods industries. The importance of efficient planning agencies 
must not be underestimated. The planning agency must be ~~11 
equipped with qualified administrators and technicians under 
an appropriate organisational set up, Above all, the governments 
should rave more patience in solving the problems. 
Economic planning is necessary in Southeast Asia 
and it is to be hoped that the limited success achieved in the 
period under consideration in thi s thesis has not discouraged 
t he governments concerned from further e:,:'.for t s in planning. 
If lessons have been learnt and r emedies are applied , economic 
planning should be much more successful in Southeast Asia in 
! f uture years . 
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